

tion must have one other nation that it hates and the nation that Germany had especially selected for hatred was the British empire. Does the hon. gentleman want us to cultivate something of that same spirit in order to meet this hatred? Is it necessary that the people of the British empire should take pains to instill in the youthful breast of every British subject hatred of Germany? Is it not better that we should rather be silent on these subjects than incur the danger of creating in this country a hatred of Germany and increasing the corresponding hatred of Germany to us? Is it not better that, if we have any causes of ill-feeling and friction with Germany that we should have such pleasant removal of it as we see to-day, in the conclusion of an agreement by the hon. Minister of Finance (Mr. Fielding) with the hon. the Consul General of Germany and endeavour to remove all possible cause of friction between these two nations.

The remarkable feature of this panic to which I have been referring, from 1851 to 1854, was that, as Cobden said, had a British subject left England on a certain day he would have been in the midst of a panic created by the possibility of a French invasion of Great Britain. Had he gone to New Zealand, and immediately returned to Great Britain, he would have seen two fleets lying side by side in Besika bay, the British and the French fleets. And knowing only what he knew of the relations of the two peoples when he left England he would naturally be solicitous to know what would be the result of an encounter between the British fleet and the French fleet, and he would be overcome with surprise when he learned that these two fleets which he contemplated as only enemies to one another were lying side by side in alliance against the great power of Russia. That panic was concluded by the alliance between France and Germany, the two nations that took part in the invasion of the Crimea. Then came the panic of 1858-59. Notwithstanding the fact that the Emperor of France, Napoleon the Third had always been friendly and was then engaged in Italy in his war against Austria, notwithstanding that apparently all the rest of the world considered that his hands were full with the management of that conflict, the panic started. It was represented in Britain that the French soldiers at Rome were chafing in their eagerness to get across the channel to take part in the sack of London. That panic continued until the Mason and Slidell incident—the Trent affair. On that affair arising Great Britain found it necessary to rush forces to Canada. Great Britain found that she was short of long boots and the French government sent a message across to England offering the British gov-

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ernment 1,500 pairs of boots to supply the soldiers who were going to Canada. Further than that, notwithstanding the attacks made upon it by the panic mongers, the French government joined with the other governments of Europe in urging upon the government of the United States that it had made a mistake in this seizure, that it had violated the law of nations, the result of these representations being that the United States government returned the two gentlemen who had been taken off the British vessel by an American man-of-war. That incident was closed in that way. Yesterday the hon. member for Pictou (Mr. Macdonald) went over the history of the later panics, and it seems to me that no one can review the panics of this kind without being persuaded that it is absolutely necessary and essential as a common sense people that we should not allow ourselves to be carried away by panics of this kind, but that we should endeavour as far as possible to assume the part of true statesmen by not creating, increasing and arousing panics but by honestly and sincerely endeavouring to allay them. There is found a passage in a speech, or possibly a pamphlet, of Sir Robert Peel who will be recognized by every one as one of the most cautious and sagacious statesmen that Great Britain produced in the last century. His language ought to appeal very strongly to all Conservatives, because he was undoubtedly one of the great Conservative leaders of the last century, and it seems to me that his language in this regard contains so much truth and common sense as to be worthy of being inculcated in the minds of all sane people. He was speaking of this eagerness for armaments in time of peace instead of reserving the gigantic efforts of the nation for times of war and he said 'We must consent to incur some risk.' He is urging retrenchment and he is pointing out that the nation is not fitting itself best for war if it expends too great a part of its resources on war in time of peace. Sir Spencer Walpole referring to the old Roman maxim *si vis pacem, para bellum*—in time of peace prepare for war—points out that it is a maxim which has been greatly modified in modern times by the recognition of the fact that money is the sinews of war and that the best preparation for war is by husbanding our resources in time of peace. As Defoe said it is not the longest sword, but the longest purse that wins in the end, and it is wise to be governed in these matters by a certain conservatism and to recognize that if not only Canada, but the whole British empire expended all its resources in endeavouring to secure itself against attack, such an expenditure made by the mother country and by all the great dominions in the endeavour to secure the em-