

foolhardy to disturb pending the evolution of more effective machinery for maintaining international order and settling international disputes. Our confidence in our potential adversaries is not such that we should wish to dispense with appropriate measures of verification in arms-control and disarmament agreements. In general, I think it can be said that we both take an active and optimistic, though realistic and pragmatic, approach to problems of reducing and eliminating the possibilities of armed conflict.

### Differences in Approach

But, as I have already suggested, there are important differences of emphasis in the Canadian and American approach to nuclear-arms control. These arise out of differences in our political institutions, in our economic strength, in the size and nature of the armed forces we maintain, in our philosophy of national power, and in our conception of our respective roles in the international community. I shall not attempt to analyze these differences in detail; they are, I think, self-evident to anyone who reflects on them. Rather, I shall attempt to show how they affect our way of looking at the important contemporary problem of how to control and restrict nuclear proliferation. Some time ago, a participant in the arms-control debate coined the terms "horizontal proliferation" and "vertical proliferation" to describe, respectively, the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states and the increase in size and capability of the nuclear arsenals of existing nuclear powers. Both are integral and inseparable aspects of the proliferation problem.

### Non-Proliferation Treaty

Let me take the former -- horizontal proliferation. The first step by which most of us hope that further horizontal proliferation can be prevented is through a non-proliferation-treaty. The Canadian Government has never veered from the line that, while a treaty must, by its very nature, discriminate against the non-nuclear signatories, it is the only rational alternative to a process -- the continued spread of nuclear weapons -- which could lead to the ultimate catastrophe of nuclear war. At the same time, however, we have been urging the nuclear powers to understand and to appreciate the sensitivities and demands of the non-nuclear world. We believe, with many other non-nuclear countries, that the non-proliferation treaty should not be regarded as an end in itself but rather should be viewed as an important first step to more comprehensive measures of nuclear-arms control. If the treaty is to stand any chance of general acceptance, it must be seen to be but an initial step leading towards a more promising future. We also wish to ensure that it reflects a fair balance of obligations as between nuclear and non-nuclear signatories.

Occasionally we hear spokesmen for the great powers -- and the United States is not altogether exempt -- argue that, since the objective of a treaty is to prevent further proliferation, which is clearly in the general interest, then the main obligations must be borne solely by the non-nuclear signatories. As a non-nuclear country, we like to remind such spokesmen that, unless the nuclear powers are prepared to accept some real obligations apart from the hardly onerous undertaking to refrain from giving away nuclear weapons, a