

some categories of petroleum distillates and ferrous metals were placed under control. These measures were intended to deny the Japanese armed forces essential supplies, as well as being intended to create economic pressure. Their limitations kept the embargoes from being a *causus bellum*, but, in general, they were counter-productive. Japanese aggression continued, and in July 1941 President Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States, effectively cutting off Japan from American oil, which at the time was 59% of the world supply. Possessing as it did an 18-month reserve stock of oil for naval war purposes, the Japanese government saw itself as presented with a deadline. The U.S. government believed that Japan would recognize that capitulation was unavoidable. Instead, the Japanese decided to use violent means to obtain control of the East Indian oil fields, and cleared the way by launching surprise attacks on the American fleet at Pearl Harbour and on U.S. and British bases in Asia.

Following the end of the Second World War control of oil has been used on several occasions as a coercive force, but with only limited success. The oil exporting nations of the Middle East attempted to use an embargo in 1967 to compel the United States, Britain and West Germany to enforce United Nations sanctions against Israel, but in the end their efforts collapsed. Oil was included in the sanctions which the United Kingdom government was persuaded in 1965 to impose on the rebellious colony of Southern Rhodesia, in order to compel Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party to establish a multi-racial government. For twelve years this proved ineffective, partly because of the open border with the Republic of South Africa. Finally, in 1978 South Africa's own difficulties in obtaining oil were intensified by the revolution in Iran. The implications for Rhodesia were self-evident. The oil crisis catalyzed the pressure caused by the growing economic and human cost of the sanctions and of guerrilla warfare within Rhodesia. After several conferences in London, a British governor flew to Salisbury to administer the transfer of power at the end of 1979.²⁰

3.3 Exports from the Target State

The coercive impact of economic pressure on the export trade of the target state has only a modestly better track record. The Declaration of Paris of 1856 banned attacks on exports, if they were transported in neutral carriers, but the experience of the world wars shows that exports may be the more important target. The British government eventually ordered action against German exports in both wars, but only as acts of reprisal "justified" by German infringement of the laws of war.²¹ The League sanctions

²⁰ M. Bailey, Oilgate, the Sanctions Scandal, (London, 1979), pp 110, 174 and 190; and Harry R. Strack, Sanctions, The Case of Rhodesia, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978), pp 24-33, 89.

²¹ Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals, pp. 156-60.