

2. The problem of handling transfers of controlled materials from parties of an arms control agreement to non-parties can create multiple safeguards systems unless a uniform requirement for such exports is part of the agreement. The possibility of applying some form of safeguards to non-parties, and how its various implications shall be handled, should be allowed for from the start.
3. Aside from considerations of threat coverage, safeguards' effectiveness is also limited by technical and resource factors. Nonetheless, a system so limited may still perform at politically adequate levels. Where levels of relevant risk are low or moderate, imperfections can be tolerated: the effect of the safeguards is to reduce "background noise." Where potential proliferators are covered by safeguards, the effect is to complicate proliferation plans and to increase costs, while these proliferators may draw attention to themselves and may then be subject to other pressures by states. Similarly, states which avoid safeguards obligations draw attention to themselves.
4. In the process of operationalizing safeguards rights, procedures and criteria, and applying them at the level of specific facilities, it would seem normal to expect some narrowing of their scope. Beyond that, there are a number of dangers that may constrain or misdirect Agency efforts and rights:
 - a) As general performance criteria are applied in specific technical contexts, they may fall short of initial goals. The distinction between broad criteria and specific performance standards may be inevitable, but it should also be carefully monitored.
 - b) The process of updating safeguards, or of replacing one safeguards agreement by another, may produce opportunities for the reinterpretation of requirements or the introduction of additional constraints. Similar opportunities may arise in negotiations for the application of general safeguards rights and procedures to specific facilities.
 - c) There may also be a tendency to confuse measures of inspection effort with measures of effectiveness.
5. The Agency's mix of safeguards techniques has been determined by considerations of intrusiveness and acceptability, as well as of adequacy and the nature of safeguards objectives and the safeguarded activities. Although containment and surveillance can ease some of the problems for materials accounting presented by some types of facilities, they also have limitations. Even so, because considerable emphasis has been given to materials accounting as the primary safeguards methodology,