

bilateral contacts could play an important part. A State could invite another State party (or a group of other States) to visit various research facilities, civilian chemical production facilities, CW production facilities and CW stockpiles so that other States could see for themselves the progress of implementation. They could also invite observers to any CW protection training exercises, thus helping to allay doubts about whether such training was intended for offensive rather than defensive purposes.

5. Voluntary bilateral contacts would play an even more important role in maintaining confidence in the Convention after the implementation period. States could invite other States to visit civilian chemical facilities to ensure that no chemical warfare agents were being produced. Similarly such contacts could be used to exchange information on research programmes, information on protective measures against chemical warfare agents and information on the use of permitted amounts of super toxins.

(b) National Verification Measures

6. The United Kingdom also believes it is important that the Convention provides for States to use national means of verification, provided that these means fall within the generally recognized principles of international law. Such national means of verification could, for example, include the surveying by satellite of areas of the earth's surface for traces of chemicals of known military significance. Stations could also be set up outside the national boundaries in order to detect the presence of CW in air masses which had previously passed over areas suspected of containing CW production or testing facilities. Details of such methods were contained in papers prepared by the United Kingdom and presented to the CCD (CCD 502 and CCD 371), and more recently in the series of Blue Books presented to the CD by the Government of Finland.

7. If a reliable indication of a possible infringement were obtained by some such surveillance technique, the case for on-site inspection would be greatly strengthened. National means of verification could not in themselves provide sufficient evidence to clarify whether an infringement of the Convention was taking place, and would not therefore in any way be a substitute for international measures of verification. Nor should it be a requirement of the Convention that a State should have to produce evidence from national verification techniques before it could request an on-site inspection. Very few developing States have the technology to develop adequate national verification measures and so a verification system based solely on national measures would not be available to the majority of States. Moreover, the cost of satellite or remote surveillance is extremely high and only a few States would be able to afford this means of verifying compliance.