

put it two decades earlier, "the bomber will always get through." This version, writes Jockel, is similarly flawed, at least insofar as the partisans of early-warning radar lines were concerned. By the time such warning systems began to seem necessary to Washington (that is, by 1952 and 1953), it was in large measure because of the conviction that the bomber need not get through. Notes Jockel: "It is striking how little consideration of the need to protect SAC had gone into the decisions to build the DEW and Mid-Canada Lines or into the American decision to augment active defences."

Thirdly, Jockel takes on those who see Canada augmenting its influence with the US as a result of participation in NORAD. The Canadian government believed, in 1958 and later, that NORAD would be a pillar of a security regime that enshrined the principles of partnership and consultation; one that in addition would be in some manner (never adequately explained) linked with NATO. The American perspective, however, differed radically; not only would NORAD not be hobbled by incarceration in the entangling Atlantic alliance, it would also not endow Canada with any influence over American security policy in areas other than the air defence of North America. It would take the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 to make this apparent to Ottawa.

The final way in which this book can be read is as a kind of allegory for contemporary issues in Canadian-American security relations. Are we, it might be asked, seeing the future of bilateral co-operation in the military use of space prefigured in this study of the evolution of air-defence collaboration? Some, no doubt, fear we are. Much more interesting, however, are the potential policy implications that Jockel's historical account might contain for the recently mooted "maritime NORAD." Jockel shows that two conditions had to be fulfilled before a unified air-defence command could be achieved: each country had to possess tangible assets (which in Canada's case meant a fairly substantial inter-

ceptor capability by the early 1950s); and there had to be a commonality of interests between the major bureaucratic champions of integration (the RCAF and the USAF).

In the case of the controversial maritime NORAD suggestion, it might be argued that our getting ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines will give us the assets, but it is hard to see how they will create a commonality of interests with the US Navy. Indeed, it is likelier that discord, not collaboration, would attend their purchase. If Jockel's analysis is any guide to the future, it appears as if the sort of arrangements that can and do work above sea level may not be very relevant below it.

— David G. Haglund

Mr. Haglund is Professor of Political Science at Queen's University and Director of Centre for International Relations.

Watershed In Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation

Jonathan Dean

*Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books/
Union of Concerned Scientists, 1987,
286 pgs., \$13.95 paper*

■ There are really two books here: one on arms control and the other on European political relationships in the military security field. Because the former consists mostly of a briefing on negotiations it is Dean's political perceptions that provide the greatest interest. He is one of the few American observers who understands the European viewpoint. He wisely ascribes much of NATO's internal tension to a Western European acceptance of the need to live with a long-term East-West confrontation and a US search for some overall resolution of it. His own opinion is that the peak of the confrontation has passed and the challenge now is to set about a long-term process of dismantling the contending military establishments. In noting the pivotal role of the two Germanies in Europe, he appraises their ripening relationship as unlikely to change the political map of Europe, but as having

the potential to round off the sharper edges of the confrontation.

As for military affairs, Dean is more or less content with NATO's current doctrines because they are demonstrably defensive in nature. He counsels some familiar military improvements, while acknowledging that they are unlikely to occur, and cautions against any dramatic change in the strategies of flexible response and forward defence.

These are difficult times to write about arms control because events are developing swiftly. Dean's historical descriptions of arms control negotiations in Europe remain valuable but, like everybody else these days, his situation reports on the current states of play are overtaken before they get into print. Nevertheless, his discussion of core issues is essentially timeless.

Experts will already be familiar with virtually all of the factual material in this book but they can learn from Dean's lucid observations. Non-experts can learn from all of it; the style is relaxed and complex issues are presented with admirable simplicity and clarity.

— John Toogood

Mr. Toogood is Secretary-Treasurer of CIIPS and was deputy-head of the Canadian delegation to the MBFR talks in Vienna from 1980 to 1983.

The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada

Douglas Bland

*Kingston, Ont.: Ronald P. Frye, 1987,
252 pgs., \$21.95 paper*

■ A comprehensive look at what the author calls "the random management system" of Canada's Department of National Defence has long been needed. Earlier attempts had been frustrated by difficulties in getting access to documents and to persons in the know. Colonel Bland has his ways, and in this semi-authorized appraisal (the researcher was provided with "special support" from two generals) of defence policy, he lifts a corner of the blanket that generally covers anything military and classified "for DND eyes and ears only."

In fact, this book is not so much about the administration of defence policy in Canada since WW II as it

is about the difficulties and conflicting loyalties, faced by military personnel of all ranks, engendered by constant administrative reorganization since 1964. Col. Bland reveals much about the internal mechanics of the system, and no doubt many old wounds will be re-opened by this study, but this reader is disturbed by what the author has not attended to: the influence of the various "types" of Chiefs of Defence Staff and Deputy Ministers. These offices are certainly as important to examine as the assorted types of Ministers of Defence which the author describes so well. In addition, the author does not discuss the influence of the government's policy on arms control, nor does he deal with the bilingualism controversy which became entangled with the debate over Forces unification.

Unfortunately, this hurriedly assembled book has many faults: the tone is often patronizing — Col. Bland is nearly always critical of Ministers and Deputy Ministers and consistently unforgiving of public servants. The colloquial English is irritating and the frequent use of unexplained military terminology is aimed only at the initiated.

Nevertheless, the author has a story to tell and recommendations to make. For the reader in a hurry, the final two chapters provide the essence of the message. Col. Bland gets full marks for attempting what military officers do best: provide military advice. This is modern military history, written by an active inside observer. No attempt is made at objectivity, nor is it claimed. The basic message is valid; that what has been called "defence by ministry" — facing new challenges and commitments by reorganization of the head office — does not work. Instead, one needs additional resources — both people and money. — Rychard Brulé
Mr. Brulé is a grants officer at the Institute. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in *Paix et Sécurité 'Livres'* section.