

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

fourth, disbandment of military alliances and, as a stage towards this, renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones, and fifth, the balanced and commensurate reduction of military budgets.

It was stated from the rostrum of the Congress that the Soviet Union is and will be acting on the world scene seriously and openly, actively and honestly. We intend to strive persistently and actively for the elimination of nuclear weapons, for a radical cutback in the arms race, for the building of international security that is dependable and equal for all States.

I have referred only to that part of the basic elements of international security proposed by the USSR which has a direct bearing on the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Now, Mr. President, permit me to dwell on item 5 of the agenda of our forum.

At present, item 5 of the agenda of the Conference, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", is acquiring ever-increasing significance. The technology of the development and production of space strike weapons is advancing and accelerating in certain places at a truly cosmic pace.

According to a statement by the Director of the SDI Programme, James Abrahamson, research on the Strategic Defense Initiative is moving from technology development to "major experiments". In addition, it was stated that the United States is also working on technology to counter possible Soviet counter-steps to the SDI. This is evidence that the United States, despite the soothing statements about the SDI programme being "research", intends to advance that programme far beyond the limits of research. Thus, the implementation of the "star wars" plans may very soon become irreversible.

We have no intention of dwelling in detail on the dangers connected with the deployment of space strike weapons. We have repeatedly set forth our viewpoint on that subject. Let us consider only one aspect: how would the Strategic Defense Initiative influence stability?

The analysis carried out in the Soviet Union and in other countries of any versions of deployment of strike weapons in outer space, or of any versions of deployment by one or by both sides of large-scale ABM systems, indicates that such actions would result in the disruption of the military equilibrium, in a sharp destabilization of the strategic situation and in the increased risk of nuclear war.

The deployment by one side of an ABM system in space practically means that it acquires an additional offensive potential (military superiority) equal to the number of the other side's strategic missiles that the ABM system is capable of neutralizing. The side that has created the ABM system for its territory acquires the capability of countering the retaliatory nuclear strike of the other side or, which is one and the same thing, the capability of a first nuclear missile strike with impunity. A situation arises when one of the sides acquires full strategic superiority and a powerful incentive to try to achieve its political aims by means of nuclear war.

In other words, the SDI, in creating the illusion of an impenetrable space shield, inevitably entails a shift towards a "first-strike" state of