

United States then possessed. In 1978 Prime Minister Trudeau proposed to "suffocate" the strategic arms race by imposing a ban on testing, and stopping the production of fissionable materials. Shortly before the *Call to Halt the Arms Race*, the American Friends Service Committee had suggested a unilateral American freeze, which had been poorly received precisely because of its unilateralism. What was new about the freeze proposed by Forsberg was the combination of timing and reasonableness. The timing was propitious because an increasingly large number of people showed a continuing, generalized anxiety about the threat of nuclear war. On the other hand, the perception that the United States was threatened by Soviet nuclear superiority was present but still disputed. A proposal which called for both sides to freeze, therefore, appeared an eminently sensible and understandable way to halt the forward momentum of the arms race as a necessary first step to the more complex negotiations involved in arms *reductions*.

In the two years following the *Call*, there is little doubt that President Reagan inadvertently fostered the movement by his policies on arms control. Although the Administration eventually developed a policy which called for deep cuts in strategic weapons, it was slow to do so. At the same time, unguarded comments by senior Administration figures suggested the feasibility of limited nuclear war, including nuclear warning shots in the event of a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. These attitudes fanned the mounting concern of the American and European publics. Support for the comprehensive freeze grew continuously: by early 1982, according to a New York Times poll, 72% of Americans favoured the freeze. In June 1982, an estimated 750,000 people, including many Canadians, took part in an anti-nuclear rally in New York City to mark the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament (UNSSOD II). This groundswell of support found its proponents in Congress. Explaining their decision to introduce freeze legislation into Congress, Senators Kennedy and Hatfield wrote: "We were convinced that a new arms control initiative was needed to offer leadership in Congress and respond to the growing public concern."

In the two Congressional sessions that followed (1982 and 1983) a see-saw battle took place between the Congressional supporters and opponents of the freeze. In 1982, Senators Kennedy and Hatfield in the Senate, and Congressman Edward Markey in the House, introduced resolutions which typically called for "a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems." The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution made

clear that this was the preamble to negotiations to *reduce* nuclear warheads and delivery systems. It also left it to the superpowers to "decide when and how" to achieve the freeze, thereby implying that the freeze itself would be the subject of a negotiation. This was a point of some consequence in the subsequent debate, since the quickest way to a freeze was a bilateral or simultaneous *declaration*, which in turn seemed to imply that issues such as verifiability did not need to be negotiated.

The counter-attack in the Senate came from Senators Jackson and Warner who, carrying the Administration's position, presented a resolution echoing the arms control policy finally announced by President Reagan in November 1981. This resolution suggested that the United States "should propose to the Soviet Union a long-term mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels." In this argument, therefore, the negotiations to reduce the level of strategic forces would *precede* the actual freeze. Such a proposal effectively contemplated a negotiation not dissimilar to those in SALT I and SALT II, but this time with deep arms *reductions*, not simply *ceilings*, as the objective.

The Congressional debates in 1982 produced mixed results, but mainly constituted a hard-won victory for the President. The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution lost in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 9 to 6, while, in a prolonged and tense debate in the House of Representatives, a resolution endorsing the position of the President passed by a vote of 204 to 202.

The next year, in 1983, similar resolutions were introduced with somewhat different results. Now with many more voices joining the debate in the press and the influential public, a version of the freeze proposal went forward in the House, and passed on May 4, 1983 by a wide margin. This resolution took a somewhat different form: it set down a series of objectives for the American negotiators at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) which had opened in Geneva in June 1982. At the top of the list was the freeze:

"the objective of negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze, then pursuing the objective of negotiating immediate, mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons."

The affirmative vote in the House, however, was little more than a pyrrhic victory for the proponents of the freeze. Some thirty amendments were integrated into the resolution, the effect of which was to erode severely the apparent commitment to the freeze. To cite just two cases, one amendment noted that "Submarines are not delivery systems as used herein," thereby exempting the further deployment