

some degree, for the defence can, therefore avail itself of all cover that may happen to present itself, and this cover it need never leave; whereas, on the offensive, cover affords but a temporary refuge. Again troops on the defensive being stationary, do not lose their order, and, therefore, the fact that a formation is unwieldy need not be taken into serious consideration. In fact, we do not hesitate to say that nearly all the arguments that are employed against the "line," apply to a line in motion, and not one in rest—therefore a change in defensive tactics is by no means obligatory; but however good existing formations may be, we should neglect no opportunity of improving on them, if we believe improvement to be possible, and see a way towards effecting so desirable an end.

For our part we believe that such improvement is possible, and that it is to be attained by a bolder and more extensive use of cavalry, and by a greater development of fire. It has often been said of late that the rôle of cavalry ceases on the field of battle; this we deny, for we believe that cavalry may still be most effectively employed during an action, and especially when acting on the defensive. It would be, of course, absurd for cavalry now to attempt grand cavalry charges, such as Waterloo, of Leipzig, and of Waterloo. To charge across an open plain under fire of artillery and infantry, in masses they are, would be as hopeless and as vain as was the glorious but desperate onslaught of the Light Brigade at Balaklava. We admit that the employment of cavalry in masses for such ends is obsolete, but we contend that, when acting on the defensive, cavalry may be employed with comparatively little risk to the selves, and with the prospect of great results; for when awaiting an attack, the cavalry may be held in reserve under cover, and out of reach of shot and shell, till the opportune moment for its employment; the enemy being close at hand, it has not then to traverse an extensive space of ground; it will not be exposed to artillery fire, thanks to the proximity of the enemy's infantry and finally, the enemy will be in no solid formation suitable for resisting cavalry; therefore, such charges would be made under circumstances the most favourable to cavalry. Such charges should not be made by large bodies of horse, for cover can rarely be found for such; they are not easily put in motion, and they offer considerable marks for the enemy's fire. Attack on an advancing enemy must be made where the opportunity arises, by regiments, by squadrons, and even by troops.

We now come to the question or development of fire, which we have already stated to be a means by which the defence may be improved and rendered more formidable. Our own ideas on the subject are novel and perhaps startling, and may no doubt meet with disapproval; it is, therefore, with extreme diffidence that we propound them.

In the meeting an attack, the front should of course be covered by skirmishers, and these skirmishers should be something more than a mere line, for the greater the loss inflicted on the enemy while advancing, the better will it be for the defence. But these skirmishers, if the attack be preserved in, will undoubtedly, sooner or later, be driven back, and then the decisive moment will arrive.

Let us suppose the position attacked to be occupied by four battalions in first line, and four in second, each battalion being 600 strong—the battalions in first line, reckoning the intervals, would therefore cover about 890 yards. The enemy, in whatever formation he approached, whether it be the swarm of

skirmishers or the line of column, would be dense, brought to bear upon the approaching masses, the greater would be the loss inflicted; therefore, the question of how to meet and repulse an enemy, simply resolves itself into this: How can we increase the amount of fire? In reply, we propose the following evolution, which might be executed when the enemy was from three to four hundred yards distant from the first line. When battalions are in line the outer companies to turn inwards, and double in on the remainder, then turning to their front, and the whole delivering a four-deep fire, the front companies kneeling, those in rear standing. Such a fire delivered by volleys would be fearfully destructive to those bodies of the enemy against which it might be directed; but this manoeuvre would necessarily leave large gaps between battalions, gaps of at least 130 yards, and these gaps should at once be filled by guns or by infantry from the second line, also in a four deep formation.

Imagine the effect that would be produced on a disordered enemy, on seeing batteries of artillery gallop up into these gaps, unlimber, and at a few hundred yards distance, pour in round after round of case shot and shrapnel, or on seeing these same gaps filled by a firm, compact mass of infantry, every man of whom was enabled to use his rifle. Few troops, we believe, could make head against such a terrible *feu d'enfer* as would be delivered by such a line; they would waver, hesitate, and finally give way—then through the intervals in the line might be launched troops of cavalry to complete the rout of the enemy, and convert the attack into flight.

It is true that these four-deep lines would suffer infinitely more than lines two deep, but then the effect of their fire would also we conceive, be doubled, and such a fire at close quarters would, from its nature, be far more efficacious than any other; in fact, we believe that no front attack could possibly succeed when opposed in such a manner. It may be urged that such a front would offer too favourable a mark for the enemy's artillery; so undoubtedly it would, if exposed to its fire, but then we would expressly forbid this manoeuvre being performed until the fire of the enemy's guns had been completely masked by the advance of its own infantry; also the reserve guns and cavalry with the infantry of the second line, should, till the very last moment, be retained as much as possible under cover.

We have now finished our task, and we trust that, in our endeavours to sketch what we believe to be a tactical system applicable to the circumstances of modern warfare, we have not failed, either by diffuseness or for want of method, to convey to the reader's mind a correct impression of our own ideas, and of the system that we have advocated. If we have done this, if we have enabled him to follow us clearly throughout, we are satisfied. We do not expect his ideas to coincide with our own, and shall not, therefore, be surprised if those ideas meet with the severest criticism. In fact, we have only hoped to impress on all the necessity of devising some system of attack by which order may be insured, and do not for a moment consider that we have thoroughly solved so difficult a problem as that of "Attack and Defence."

COMING IN TIME.—Mr. P. T. Barnum's travelling menagerie hypodrome and world's fair will pay Ottawa a visit sometime during the coming summer.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

A correspondent of the *Daily News* writes as follows:—"The carcass of the dead alive 'military reform' is being still fought and screamed over by the vultures of the Russian press; but the most important point of all finds no place in it. Soldiers Russia may indeed possess, but who shall supply her with officers? More than one must have asked himself this question during the past week while watching the young subalterns who swagger about the Nevski Prospect, talking loudly about the duplicity of England with regard to the Khiva expedition, and the punishment which awaits her. Our military system has undoubtedly faults enough of its own, but the time has not yet come, thank God, when an English mess-room can combine for the expulsion of a single officer from sheer jealousy of his superior abilities, when the whole body can refuse the challenge of their intended victim; when the colonel himself can aid and abet this cowardly malice, and finally submit to a public beating at the hands of the injured man without any attempt at resistance beyond a cry for help to the police. All these things have occurred here in open day within the last three weeks, and I am not surprised to see that the Russian papers, so ready to chronicle events not worthy of mention are silent upon these. Such stories, if suffered to get abroad, would hardly tend to enhance the prestige of Russia as a military empire. It is true that the army of the Czar can as little be judged of by creatures such as these as by the ruffians who directed the massacre of Hango Head and the mutilation of the English slain at Inkerman. I who write have seen the last survivors of those who stood in the Great Redoubt at Borodino or rode in the van of the crowning charge at Leipzig, and, looking upon them, I felt proud to think that we had fought with such men as these, and had conquered; but of the *filibusters* of the Nevski Prospect it is better to say nothing. Let one should say to much: Well, will it be if it fare not one day with them as it fared with the butterflies of the Second Empire, reared upon absinthe and cigarettes, upon low comedies and foul romances, when the great day of wrath came upon them at Sedan. Some may, perhaps, admire this precocious *jeunesse dorée*, flaunting in all the pride of its tinsel finery and puny licentiousness, with just intellect enough to shoot those who suspect it; but there are many who think otherwise. The Russian soldiers who were shot a year ago for attempting the life of their commanding officer gave by that attempt a testimony respecting the present régime such as may be given by unlettered men who neither makes speeches in the Senate nor writes for the *Journal de St Petersburg*, and when that testimony shall be written across the length and breadth of Russia in the same red hand writing which now scars the surface of France, perhaps even she may believe it then."

BREAKFAST.—EPPS'S COCOA.—GRATEFUL AND COMFORTING.—The very agreeable character of this preparation has rendered it a general favorite. The *Civil Service Gazette* remarks:—"The singular success which Mr Epps attained by his homoeopathic preparation of cocoa has never been surpassed by any experimentalist. By a thorough knowledge of the natural laws which govern the operations of digestion and nutrition, and by a careful application of the fine properties of well-selected cocoa, Mr. Epps has provided our breakfast tables with a delicately flavoured beverage which may save us many heavy doctors' bills." Made simply with boiling water or milk. Sold by the Trade only in 1lb., 1/2lb., and 1/4lb. tin-lined packets, labelled—JAMES EPPS & CO., Homoeopathic Chemists, London, England.