

## A CLEAR CASE OF CUT OUT.

It is many years since I fell in love  
With Jane Jerusha Skeggs,  
The handsomest country girl by far  
That ever went on logs.

By meadow, creek, and wood, and dell,  
So often we did walk,  
And the moonlight smiled on her melting lips,  
And the night winds learned our talk.

Jane Jerusha was all to me,  
For my heart was young and true,  
And loved with a double and twisted love,  
And a love that was honest, too.

I reamed all over the neighbours' farms,  
And I robbed the wildwood bowers,  
And tore my trousers and scratched my hands,  
In search of choicest flowers.

In my joyous love I brought  
All these to my Jerusha Jane:  
But I wouldn't be so foolish now  
If I were a boy again.

A city chap then came along,  
All dressed up in blue clothes,  
With a shiny hat and shiny vest,  
And a moustache under his nose.

He talked to her of stinking schools,  
(For her father owned a farm,)  
And she left me, the country love,  
And took the new chaps arm.

And all that night I never slept,  
Nor could I eat next day,  
For I loved that girl with fervent love  
That ought could drive away.

I strove to win her back to me,  
But it was all in vain,  
The city chap with the hairy lip  
Married Jerusha Jane.

And my poor heart was sick and sore,  
Until the thought struck me,  
That just as good fish still remained  
As ever was caught in the sea.

So I went to church one Sunday night,  
And saw a dark brown curl,  
Peeping from under a gipsy hat,  
And I married that very girl.

And many years have passed and gone,  
And I think my loss my gain;  
And I often bless that hairy chap  
That stole Jerusha Jane.

## FRANCE.

(From the Edinburgh Review.)

[CONCLUDED.]

Count Bismarck undoubtedly foresaw in 1866 the relative inferiority of Austria to Prussia in military strength, especially when attacked at once on the Elbe and on the Po; and in this respect he showed a degree of penetration shared by few persons in Europe. Did he in 1870 entertain a similar belief as to the relative strength of Prussia, aided by the South German States and of France? That is a question to which at present no answer can be given; but it is not impossible that he may have arrived at a similar conclusion. He knew the strength of the German armies: he probably had information that the French could not place above half that number of troops on the frontier, and that the French reserves under the law of 1868 were not organized. He knew the character of the Emperor, the weakness of his government, and the absence of high military talent in the army. But in addition to this personal and military considerations, there are numerous facts and arguments arising out of the condition of France herself, which might perhaps suggest the same conclusion to a man of more than common powers of discernment. To these, as they appear to us to be displayed by the unexampled and unforeseen events of the last few months, we now return, and they are the more interesting as they raise questions of general application to the interests of society in other countries at the present day.

It has been said, and the fact will hardly

be disputed, that the strong monarchical constitution of Prussia is one great element of her power. Hereditary Kingship is a sacred and as valuable in the eye of the Prussians, as if her princes came of the divine race of Heracleids. In France, hereditary monarchy, by which we mean the indefeasible right of the head of the State to rule by descent, and to transmit his power to his next heir, perished on the scaffold with Louis XVI. Attempts have been made by each succeeding government to revive it. But these have in fact failed. No French sovereign, except Charles X., has taken the crown by succession since the commencement of the Revolution; and the right of succession, though constantly acknowledged by the law, has been so often set aside by revolutions, that no reliance can be placed upon it. 'I cannot forget,' said Napoleon III. to Lord Clarendon on the birth of his son in the Tuileries in 1856, 'that no prince born in this house has succeeded his father on the throne.' In fact, the duration of a dynasty in France is from fifteen to twenty years.

What then, is the true value of hereditary monarchy? Does it conduce to the strength and stability of governments by determining the succession to supreme power, or does it detract from them by the chance of placing that power in incapable hands? The answer of a theoretical reasoner on government might admit of doubt. The answer of practical experience resolves that doubt, and for sufficient reasons. When the succession to the supreme power depends on a popular vote, a legislative preference, or a revolution, the dynastic question is continually paramount to every other consideration in the mind of the ruler. His object is to transmit or perpetuate his power, and to this object the whole policy of his reign is subservient. At any moment the change may occur. At any moment he or his heirs must be prepared to meet it. A king who ascends the throne by even the most legitimate forms of election, as William III. in England or Louis-Philippe in France, must be prepared to deal with large bodies of his own subjects who dispute or detest his authority. The Jacobites conspired against William, the Royalists and Republicans waged a factious opposition against the House of Orleans. Louis Napoleon was elected by a vast majority of the French people, but the minority, consisting of the best, the wisest, and the ablest men in the country, stood aloof from him and his government, and were throughout his reign his irreconcilable enemies. An elective sovereign therefore no longer represents the integrity of his empire. The house is divided against itself. The divisions of party on such a question attack and weaken, not only the administrative functions of the government, but the representative of the State itself. The sovereign therefore regards a portion of his own subjects as his most formidable enemies, and should a crisis of danger occur, which ought to call forth the united action of every citizen, that is the very moment his adversaries or rivals will select to overthrow him. Francis I. after Pavia was not the less King of France in a Spanish prison. Napoleon III. after Sedan is a nameless fugitive in a foreign palace, and the State drifts in total anarchy to the verge of dissolution. The hereditary rights of the Valois were unassailable, those of the Bonapartes are a jest.

Even in the United States of America, where the periodical renewal of the supreme magistracy by election is established by law and peacefully conducted, the presidential election weakens the authority of the State and of the Ruler. It was a presidential

election which caused the civil war. Another election ensued in the heat of the contest; the Americans very wisely kept Mr. Lincoln in his place. Every American President is usually occupied with the desire of procuring his own re-election, or, if his second term of service is nearly over, of procuring the election of one of his adherents. General Grant at this moment is in the former position, and his policy is governed by it. The policy of his opponents is equally governed by the hope of defeating him and taking his place. Hence personal interests largely control and distort public measures. There is now, we are sorry to say, a party in the United States who would not scruple to plunge their country into war with England, if they thought that measure would give them a majority at the next Presidential election. The fault is not so much in the men, as in the vicious institutions which hold out such temptations to faction.

In this country, if by any misfortune the principle of hereditary monarchy were shaken, we have no doubt that the people of England have sufficient experience of freedom and sufficient respect for the law of Parliament to conduct peaceably their own affairs. But the golden bond which holds together the British Empire would be broken. The central force, which makes this nation so great a power in the world, would be dissipated. The symbol, which is recognised alike by the free settlers of Australia and by the dusky natives of Hindostan, would be lost. The outlying realms of British rule would recognise no allegiance to the elected ruler of the English people, who might be good enough for us, but who would be no thing to them. As it is, whatever may be the defects of our political and social institutions, Great Britain may boast that for more than one hundred and eighty years the course of law and the tranquillity of the realm have been unbroken, and that, enjoying as much freedom as any people in the world, she has also enjoyed a degree of internal peace, order, and security to which no other nation can lay claim.

These examples may illustrate the value and the strength of what we mean by the principle of hereditary monarchy; and however seductive the theory of republican election may be to some minds, we defy them to replace it. All other principles of supreme government are contested and contested, and this especially at the most critical moments. Dynastic law and tradition alone place the representative of the supreme power above every accident except that of the extinction of his race. The French Revolution in striking down the monarchy of a thousand years destroyed the tradition, and it has not been restored. They have substituted for it the ideal of 'France'—and no doubt in a country so homogeneous and so patriotic the name is a name of power. But France not represented by any efficient lawful sovereign, or represented by a committee of declaratory lawyers carried to the Hôtel de Ville by a Parisian mob, is in fact as helpless as an idol of wood or stone. Who speaks with authority in her name? Who controls the passions and interests of her provinces with an equal hand? Who protects her? Who defends her? Who can ever direct aright the course of her policy towards the enemy or the passionate self-sacrifice of her sons? Who can make peace? Who can contract in her name? In nothing is the present contest more fearfully unequal, than in the fact that it lies between the most powerful monarchy of Europe, governed with absolute clear sighted authority by its king, and a headless State, torn as much by internal dissensions as by foreign invasion. Prussia, too,