

because certain important inferences may be drawn from it.

Why is it that such a great proportion of those early pioneers have been distinguished for their brilliancy at the Bar and in all the various branches of the work of the legal profession? Their knowledge of root principles has a sweep that seems utterly lacking in scores of modern practitioners. It is surely unreasonable to ascribe it to the fact that they were set adrift to burrow for themselves as best they might to prepare for the examinations. At any rate to so argue is to suggest that the coming of the Law School had a detrimental rather than a beneficial effect. The answer must be sought elsewhere. Some cognizance should be taken of the fact that many of the present leaders whom the younger members of the Bar are wont to admire for the depth and breadth of their legal knowledge, have lived through a period of much transitional change, and of necessity have much more than a bowing acquaintance for example, with "actions of assumpsit," "trespass on the case," "demurrers," etc., etc., (terms that are like a foreign language to many a young lawyer of 1922), and, (what is of even greater importance) with the division between legal and equitable jurisdictions. Allowance must also be made for the fact that with the prevalence of the twentieth century mania for money-making, there has been a tendency, not by any means confined to the legal profession, towards superficiality, and this tendency has been expressed within our ranks in the form of efforts to direct one's studies especially towards that kind of knowledge which best serves in the making of a living, rather than in the cultivation of the mind. And so we have been content to learn the rule without knowing anything of the reason for it. Suffice it that the rule is there and must be followed, "don't ask us why." And a third factor, no doubt, is found in the fact that procedure has been made so loose and flexible (with the high intent that justice and not technique should be paramount) that accuracy of thinking and expression have ceased to be as indispensable as they once were. This aspect is most noticeable, perhaps, in the familiar case of pleadings. Time was when the fate of the cause depended on the pleadings being in proper form, and their preparation required a basic knowledge of the legal principles governing the case. All that is swept away, and pleadings in many cases have the appearance of being the work