erating voice. Consequently the decree of the Vice-Chancellor was reversed, and an order for sale substituted for that for partition.

And lastly, the Vice-Chancellor seems to have stretched the equitable doctrine of the liability of trustees to an extent calculated seriously to alarm trustees. The comments of our contemporary, the *Times*, will best describe the alarm:—"The myriad trustees and executors scattered throughout the kingdom will have read with dismay our report of the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Malins in a case reported in our columns last Thursday, and have asked themselves, 'Who, then, is safe?' Many more, who are not yet trustees, will probably have resolved, from a perusal of the same report, never upon any consideration to to undertake the office. A man knows that he subjects himself to great trouble for few thanks, but he strains a point to oblige a living friend, or to do what he can for the family of one whom he has known intimately and pleasantly all the years of his manhood. He is content to give his time and his pains for the sake of 'auld lang syne.' Vice-Chancellor Malins shows us by his decision in *Sculthorpe* v. *Tipper* that a trustee exposes himself to many liabilities beyond the mere labour and the vexation of spirit attendant upon it. He may have to make good the value of the estate which he has most conscientiously striven to guard. A man dies, and by his will leaves certain property to some friends to watch over and sell 'so soon after his death as they may see fit.' For little more than two years they dealt with it just as he would have done had he been alive, and it then turns out to their unbounded surprise, as it would have been to his unbounded surprise, that part of it is worthless. If the man had lived, he would have suffered the loss, and those upon whom he intended to confer his bounty would have suffered it: but as he luckily died at an opportune time, his friends and executors find that they are personally called upon to pay for his indiscreet investments. If the law be as it was enunciated by Vice-Chancellor Malins, the executors and trustees in *Sculthorpe* v. *Tipper* must perforce submit to it. There is, however, always the possibility of an appeal, and until the time for it has passed by it would be premature to call upon Parliament to relieve trustees from so unexpected a pitfall." And our contemporary feels so strongly on the case that it goes into the law of it, quotes Lord Cottenham against the Vice-Chancellor, and plainly doubts whether the latter's view of the law be sound.

These three cases even as they stand, the third being unappealed as yet, present an extraordinary condition of things—a condition of things unpleasant to comment upon, and which it is only possible to deal with gracefully by leaving alone.—*Law Times.*

EXAMINATIONS FOR CALL TO THE BAR.

In future the passing an examination in law will be made compulsory on all those seeking admission to the Bar. Hitherto such admission has been obtained in one or other of three ways, viz., by reading in chambers, by attendance at certain lectures instituted by the Inns of Courts, or by submitting to an examination. Upon the first two ways we do not propose to offer any remarks beyond reminding our readers that in the one the payment of a fee of 100 guineas, and in the other attendance at the lecture, not to the lecturer, has been the important point. It is to the third that we would direct attention. The examination for call to the Bar should be pre-eminently practical—how far does it satisfy these requisites? The subjects it includes are five, viz.: (1) Constitutional Law; (2) Equity; (3) Real Property; (4) Jurisprudence, Civil, and International Law; (5) Common Law. For an ordinary certificate, the candidate must "pass" in three at least of the above, viz., in real property, in either constitutional law or jurisprudence, &c., and in either equity or common law. He of course may, and if a competitor for honours must, take up the whole list.

The next point is the amount of reading required in each subject. Turning to the regulations just issued for the next examination we find that the books mentioned under (1) are Hallam and Broom's Constitutional Law. Hallam ends at 1760, and therefore a candidate may pass in constitutional law without knowing a bit about modern legislation, without ever having heard of the Reform Acts, of the Regency Bills, of the various Religious Relief Acts, of the Municipal Corporations Act, or of the "Union." This subject is also dignified with the additional appellation of "legal history," but as the extent of "legal history" required can be gleaned from the "concluding chapter of Blackstone's Commentaries," no student need fear overloading his brains on this score. We might perhaps venture to suggest the addition of May to complete the constitutional history, and a few pages from the Year Books in order to secure some acquaintance with the only source of our legal history.

In the next subject, Equity, an attempt is made to secure a complete general, though elementary, knowledge. Two or three works are set down, each well known to beginners, and candidates for honours have also to look over the first volume of White and Tudor's Legal Cases.

In real property there is also a work named, Williams on the Law of Real Property, the reading of which is, no doubt, useful for instilling into the mind of the eager tyro some theoretical notions. A deeper knowledge is expected to be attained by the perusal of infinitesimal portions of various authors, viz., fifteen pages of Jarman on Wills, twenty pages