

(CTB). Progress has hardly been rapid, and this unhappy fact has prompted an annual ritual in which the UN General Assembly "regrets the absence of positive results". The appreciation by some of the complexities of the issues involved, particularly in the SALT, is outweighed by the frustration of many. Despite recent signs of progress, the temptation to insist on greater United Nations involvement in the process is considerable. Whether such involvement would actually be effective, or even marginally helpful, is another question.

By virtue of Canada's role as an exporter of nuclear technology, it has a deep commitment to non-proliferation, and this subject is accorded top priority in Canadian foreign policy. On vertical proliferation, our ability to influence the outcome of the SALT talks is at best indirect, and we shall not be able to contribute further to the process of achieving agreement on a CTB Treaty until the three states most directly involved can table for discussion the outlines of a draft text in the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Even so, Canada has already contributed to preparing the groundwork through international seismological studies that have helped to demonstrate how underground nuclear tests might be identified by teleseismic means.

Canada's commitment to horizontal non-proliferation has been expressed through its efforts in the London Suppliers Group, the role it has played in supporting the acceptance of more comprehensive and effective safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its participation in the International Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) exercise. The standards set as a result of Canada's safeguards requirements for nuclear exports, announced in December 1974 and December 1976, are the most stringent in the world. At the special session, one of Canada's major tasks will be to do what it can to encourage a rededication of the international community to non-proliferation, especially as it is embodied in the NPT and the "full-scope" safeguards system.

The aim of strengthening the safeguards system is not universally shared, and the Third World's idealism on things nuclear tends to dissolve when the subject is raised. Much of the debate may centre on a question of principle: how to reconcile the prerequisites of effective safeguards and non-proliferation guarantees with what some countries of the Third World consider their "inalienable right of unrestricted access to nuclear technology" for peaceful purposes, as defined by themselves. In the Canadian view, these aims are not as incom-

patible as they might seem, and can be reconciled if non-nuclear-weapon states agree to make binding non-proliferation undertakings backed up by the acceptance of comprehensive safeguards administered by the IAEA. Some Third World countries, however, have been reluctant to accept this formula, arguing that the "imposition" of safeguards would represent an encroachment on their sovereignty. In the meantime, and as an adjunct to encouraging non-proliferation, Canada has proposed that there be assurances by nuclear-weapon states designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon states in their own security from nuclear attack.

More reticent

Since it directly affects their own requirements for security, many Third World countries become much more reticent on the subject of conventional arms than on nuclear weaponry. This despite the fact that Third World countries spend, generally speaking, at least as large a part of their gross national product on defence as industrialized countries. And they can afford it less. Paradoxically, it is only in Central Europe, where the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are involved, that there are any talks (MBFR) in progress aimed at reducing levels of conventional forces.

Yet Third World countries are acutely aware that, of the roughly \$350 billion spent annually on armaments, the greater part is related to the East-West military competition, and the largest part of that on conventional (as opposed to nuclear) weapons. They are particularly mindful of the fact that UNGA Resolution 2603E(XXIV) of 1969 declared the 1970s the Disarmament Decade and recommended that:

Consideration be given to channeling a substantial part of the resources freed by measures in the field of disarmament to promote the economic development of developing countries.

The idea of channeling funds from destructive to constructive purposes may have a certain degree of elegance in its symmetry – and, indeed, moral appeal. Many countries, Canada included, believe that disarmament and development are two distinct objectives – related, perhaps, but not directly – and that the conceptual link between them is not well understood. Canada has, therefore, supported a proposal by the Scandinavian countries that there be a United Nations study of the relation between these two subjects.

An additional problem is the symbiotic relation that has frequently developed between the supplier and the recipient of arms. This means, in effect, that through

*Demonstrating
the potential
for identifying
nuclear tests*