

emigration from the Soviet Union and the release of political prisoners.

The Administration has, however, limited the impact of its efforts by its hyperbole and its failure to establish adequate criteria for implementing its own human rights policy. Its initial verbal activism without sufficient consideration of the effect on other important U.S. priorities hurt the Carter image. The Administration did not recognize that there are a number of other vital U.S. interests as well as human rights. Rather, it spoke of human rights issues as though they were the overriding interest in U.S. foreign policy.

Trade and Economic Relations

In contrast to the preceding administration, Carter has pursued a consistent and generally successful free-trade policy. The Administration has achieved favorable terms for the U.S. with the GATT agreement and has improved its global economic relations. The two major problem areas are Europe and Japan. The apparent lack of attention to the declining dollar has angered some European allies. They relate this failure to the weak domestic energy policy and the resulting increase in oil imports which wrought havoc

with U.S. balance of payments. Although the Administration is attempting to solve the Japanese trade problem, it is limited by institutional and domestic forces in both countries. Overall, the Carter Administration has made substantial progress on both these issues.

The Balance Sheet

Why is the Carter report card so uneven? Given global complexities, the Carter Administration has performed well on most issues. Its inconsistency is, in part, a result of the management of inevitable contradictions in any foreign policy. When it has faltered, however, the Carter Administration has too often been a prisoner of its own rhetoric.

Why is the Administration's foreign policy so little understood? Without a clear crisis, and without clear domestic mandates on any issues, it is difficult for any administration to define its foreign policy. But the Carter style has unnecessarily obfuscated the substance of its foreign policy. As Brzezinski cogently argued in 1971, there was no Nixon doctrine. Similarly, today, there is no Carter doctrine, and the President's chief task ought to be a lucid explanation of his goals and strategies.

International trade environment in the post-MTN period

by Robert G. Clark

The Tokyo Round may have been the last and most ambitious multilateral trade and tariff negotiations (MTN) to be conducted on a comprehensive and global basis. The initialling of the results also marks the first time that any major GATT trade negotiation has been concluded during a protracted period of slow growth in the world economy. At the four economic Summits held from 1975 through 1978, leaders sought to give impetus to an early and satisfactory conclusion of the GATT negotiations then in progress. At the Tokyo Summit leaders drew attention to the MTN achievement, and pledged commitment to the "early and faithful implementation" of the MTN agreements. Now, attention can be focused still more closely on the fundamental medium-term structural issues which will condition the international trading environment in the post-MTN period,

and on the major trade-policy issues which flow from them.

Slow growth

The advanced industrial economies are having to adjust to sharp increases in the cost of energy, persistent inflationary pressures and reduced growth rates. In

Mr. Clark is a foreign service officer in the Department of External Affairs, currently with the Department's Commercial and Economic Policy Division. Since he joined the Department in 1972, his responsibilities have focused on Canada-U.S. affairs, and more recently on trade policy development. He has served in Washington, D.C. The views expressed here are those of Mr. Clark.