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and not at all the part certain Irish elements in the United States of America might play in post-war relationships. I said that, in my opinion, a recriminatory note from the United States, cast along the lines of Mr. Gray's memorandum would certainly be met with refusal. Moreover, the note, to my mind, seemed to be drafted in such a way as to provoke a refusal. In addition, if a refusal were received, which was the only answer one could anticipate, I foresaw that resentment would replace any benevolence which Ireland had heretofore exhibited, and the elimination, or curtailment of acts of good will could not be of any advantage insofar as the Allied war-effort was concerned. I added that, although I did not pretend to know anything about American politics it seemed to me that when the note, as suggested by Mr. Gray, was published it might very well stir up anger in Irish-American circles, and I could not see how this would be of any aid to the post-war relationship between the United States of America and Great Britain.

5. Later, Sir John Maffey told me that the British Cabinet, as a whole, was of the opinion that such a note would serve no useful purpose, and that this message was conveyed to the Government of the United States of America.

6. Just before I went to London Mr. Gray received a redrafted memorandum which, I think, had been prepared by Mr. Cordell Hull. It was along entirely different lines to the Gray memorandum. It suggested that, in view of future plans, the United States of America would like to know now, if the necessity arose, could the Americans count on port and air facilities in Ireland? It was not in the least recriminatory. Both Sir John Maffey and Mr. Gray thought it was weak and ineffectual. When asked what I thought of it, I said I considered that, broadly speaking, it was along the right lines because it was based on possible war needs, and not on post-war politics, and, regardless of whether it was accepted or refused, neither was it subject to the same criticism as Mr. Gray's memorandum.

7. Yesterday Mr. Gray read me a telegram he had received from Mr. Cordell Hull explaining that from a military point of view it was inadvisable to ask for immediate possession of air and port facilities, because, if acceded to, it would mean the immediate despatch of air and ground defence, which the United States of America did not think advisable to undertake at this time, particularly as it was not clear whether the advantages to be gained were worth while. Sir John Maffey and Mr. Gray have just informed me that, in view of Mr. Cordell