

cality, and pronounced in any other part of the world, acquits us.—Moreover you paid us for similar spoliations in the administration of Mr. Pitt: so did your allies in the invasion of neutral rights.—Perhaps in discussing the question we might agree to a similar reference; perhaps our mutual friend Russia might give us a casting vote; or lend us an umpire. You must not expect to be *always* judge in your own cause; were it enemy's property there could be no other tribunal, but this is not even pretended.

35th Par.—“Had the American Government been sincere in representing the Orders in Council, as the only subject of difference between Great Britain and the United States, calculated to lead to hostilities; it might have been expected, so soon as the revocation of those Orders had been officially made known to them, that they would have spontaneously recalled their ‘letters of marque,’ and manifested a disposition immediately to restore the relations of peace and amity between the two powers.”

36th Par.—“But the conduct of the Government of the United States by no means corresponds with such reasonable expectations.”

37th Par.—“The Order in Council of the 23rd of June being officially communicated in America, the Government of the United States saw nothing in the Repeal of the Orders in Council, which should of itself restore peace, unless Great Britain were prepared, in the first instance, substantially to relinquish the right of impressing her own seamen, when found on board American merchant ships.”

Here again we must refer to paragraph 30. Once for all we *never* did represent the Orders in Council as the *only* subject calculated to lead to hostilities. And if we have shown, as we have abundantly shown, that we had other most irritating and most cruel causes of hostility; how can you have the conscience to turn our forbearance to commence it, into a jesuitical pretence of insincerity on our part?

58th Par.—“The proposal of an armistice, and of a simultaneous repeal of the restrictive measures on both sides, subsequently made by the commanding officer of His Majesty's naval forces on the American coast, were received in the same hostile spirit by the Government of the United States. The suspension of the practice of impressment was insisted upon, in the correspondence which passed on that occasion, as a necessary preliminary to a cessation of hostilities: negotiation, it was stated, might take place without any suspension of the exercise of this right, and also without any armistice being concluded; but Great Britain was required previously to agree, without any knowledge of the adequacy of the system which could be substituted, to negotiate upon the basis of accepting the legislative regulations of a foreign state, as the sole equivalent for the exercise of a right, which she has felt to be essential to the support of her maritime power.”

39th Par.—“If America, by demanding this preliminary concession, intends to deny the validity of that right, in that denial Great Britain cannot acquiesce; nor will she give countenance to such a pretension, by acceding to its suspension, much less to its abandonment, as a basis on which to treat. If the American Government has devised, or conceives it can devise, regulations which may safely be accepted by Great Britain, as a substitute for the exercise of the right in question, it is for them to bring forward such a plan