

est obligé de s'en tenir à la lettre d'un d'un traité dont la condition essentielle, le *status quo*, n'est pas observé par l'autre partie contractante. Le traité d'Amiens a été considéré comme nul et non avenue par le Gouvernement François, puisque les envahissemens de cette puissance lui donnent sur la Grande Bretagne les avantages que cette dernière puissance n'a point consenti à lui céder. Si la Grande Bretagne s'emparoit d'une province des Etats-Unis, la France auroit incontestablement le droit de lui déclarer la guerre, quoique l'intégrité des Etats-Unis ne soit pas garantie par le traité d'Amiens, parce que cet envahissement seroit une violation du traité d'Amiens, qui a fixé la puissance respective des deux parties contractantes sur un pied différent de ce qu'il seroit, si l'Angleterre ajoutoit à ses possessions une portion du territoire des Etats-Unis.

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THE TREATY OF AMIENS NOT BINDING ON THE COUNTRY.

Sir,—I shall not trouble your readers with a dissertation on the law of nations, on the obligations of treaties, on the circumstances which render them nugatory; on the lawful grounds of war, on the balance of power, &c.—These are points which have long since been settled, and large volumes have been written on these subjects, separately and collectively.—I shall only state a few facts to elucidate the question as it now exists between the contracting parties respecting the treaty of Amiens.

As it appears that Malta is the principal point in dispute at this moment, its importance ought to be clearly ascertained.—By the length of the article in the treaty which regards this island, it would seem

that the evacuation of it by Great Britain was the principal object which France had in view; and the securing its neutrality and independence the only concession required of the First Consul.—We are willing to allow that Malta is of very great importance, and that ministers should not have consented, in November last, to evacuate it. But how comes it to pass, that only four months ago ministers were ignorant of its importance? Did they then not know that the possession of it would secure to us the command of the Mediterranean, as the evacuation of it would give to France the sovereignty of the sea, and exclude us from it for ever? Did they not know that its occupation would give to this country the means of protecting in a great measure Italy, Turkey, and Egypt, which otherwise must lie prostrate at the mercy of France.—Buonaparté seemed anxious to place it in feeble hands.—Our negotiators were satisfied by being promised a guarantee, as if that could save it from the claws of France. Taking it however for granted that Buonaparté had no intention of wresting from the hands of the knights, he still had obtained his object by excluding us from the only port in the Mediterranean, which could be a check on his ambition, and stop the progress of his aggrandizement in those parts.—The necessity that France should occupy Malta, in order to effect all its government has in view, does not appear. She has Elba.—She can command the ports of Sicily,—and probably will, when we have quitted Malta, make a conquest of the whole island, in spite of the knights of the order, and in spite of our ministry.—By the treaty of Amiens, certain possessions, or acquisitions made during the war, were disposed of.—France and Great-Britain were pla-