

If, however, the Soviet delegation refuses to accept some such definition of international control, then their resolution on peace and disarmament will be exposed for what it would be - a propaganda manoeuvre designed for purposes far removed from ensuring peace and security.

Another important step which we can take at this Assembly has already been suggested by the United States Delegation in their valuable proposal for the strengthening of the Assembly. It has always been the view of our delegation that the Assembly should be a second line of defence for the security of members of the United Nations when the Security Council is able to act. Fortunately, when the crisis came in Korea, the Security Council was able to act - with speed and force. This decisiveness, made possible because of the fortuitous and temporary absence of the Soviet member, forced the Soviet Government into a hasty reconsideration of its determination never to sit in on the Security Council with any Chinese representative except the one which it had chosen. On the first of August, there was an end to dramatic walk-outs, and in their place we had a walk-back which was equally dramatic because it showed how the United Nations had come to be regarded as a powerful instrument for peace, even by those who disliked the peace that it was enforcing. But now the spectre of the irresponsible and unprincipled use of the veto hangs over us once more - together with all the other devices for delay and frustration which have been used by communists all over the world to disrupt the activities of democratic bodies. In these circumstances the Canadian delegation welcomes the United States proposals which will make it possible, in appropriate circumstances, to fall back upon the General Assembly as an instrument to express the determination of free people to resist aggression.

We are particularly interested in that part of the United States proposal which would call upon member states to hold forces in readiness for the use of the United Nations. Certainly the need for such measures was demonstrated by the emergency in Korea. Our own experience is a case in point. As early as 1946, the Canadian Delegate at the United Nations said that we were prepared to establish our Article 43 forces immediately, and that we would like the United Nations to tell us what military preparations we should make to fulfil our obligations under the Charter. The Military Staff Committee, however, was never permitted to function because of the obstructive tactics of the Soviet representative, and as a result there was never any plan into which we could fit our collective security plans. Consequently, when the call came for help in Korea, my country - and other countries - did not have at hand land forces, earmarked and trained for United Nations use, which could be quickly thrown into that area. Canada was able, however, to send without delay naval and air help and we then set about determining how best we could contribute to United Nations forces on the ground. We felt that this was exactly the kind of situation which members of the United Nations were supposed to prepare for under Article 43. So we decided, therefore, that we would take this occasion to put ourselves in readiness not only to meet the appeal in Korea but to fulfil similar commitments under the Charter in the future. For that purpose we have recruited in Canada a special force: a brigade group, trained and equipped by the Canadian Government