

independence unilaterally, over the objections of minorities and other legitimate stakeholders, thereby forgo any claim for the subsequent intervention of the international community on their behalf, even if they become the victims of aggression and war crimes perpetrated by those who reject their secessionist aspirations.

### III DAYTON AND BEYOND

Several speakers shared a doubt that the Dayton Accord will become the basis for a lasting peace. There are at least three conventional grounds for this doubt: First, from the outset Dayton was patently a less satisfactory solution than other proposals (e.g. the Vance-Owen plan) for ending the war in Bosnia which the West had rejected years earlier. Second, Dayton will soon result in the breakup of Bosnia into ethnic states, which is exactly what the Western democracies rejected all along. Third, the Dayton provisions were grossly under-financed and even the promised funds have not been disbursed to aid resettlement, reconstruction, and recovery on the ground. Fourth, therefore, as soon as all NATO troops leave Bosnia, and perhaps even before, the antagonists will resume their warfare. In view of this possibility, NATO (including the United States) should develop realistic plans to remain in Bosnia for a long time.

If asked, probably all our speakers would have acknowledged believing these four points. Beyond these, each one also had other special worries about Dayton. Bogdan Denitch was the most vociferous, charging that every expert on Yugoslavia had been excluded from the Dayton process, along with all members of democratic opposition parties and all NGOs. Dayton solely "recognizes the bandits in power." Instead of disarming all the parties, Dayton will actually permit them to rearm. And Dayton called for elections prematurely before proper preparations could be carried out, thereby lending legitimacy to criminal politicians who should never be accepted, even if they were fairly elected — which they were not.

Still, said Denitch, it is impossible to put Yugoslavia back together again. The best we can hope for is to create democratic societies from the fragments of that country. That will require guaranteeing stable, secure, but soft, borders.<sup>28</sup> All countries in the region should permit dual citizenship. Also, the most urgent thing is to make citizens safe wherever they are now. For this they need good police. It is dangerous to have war

criminals as police chiefs. Solving that is more important than holding elections. "Americans have a touching belief," said Denitch, "that holding an election cures problems. Alas, that is not well-documented."

Several speakers expressed some doubt as to the value of the war crimes tribunals in The Hague — not because they want the guilty to remain unpunished, but because they want a more comprehensive process. So far, NATO has not used its troops to apprehend those accused of war crimes and deliver them to The Hague for trial. Moreover, these speakers argue that ordinary soldiers should not be punished for crimes unless their leaders and the people who sold them their weapons are also punished. The current regimes, despite having been elected, should be ostracized, for their presidents even now deserve to be identified as war criminals. It was Germany who insisted on recognizing these countries prematurely, and therefore the international community should hold Germany responsible for the atrocities that have resulted. All Western states should demand that Germany exercise more pressure on these protégé regimes, especially the Croatian government.

#### The Lessons of Dayton

There are many possible lessons to be drawn from the Dayton experience. I shall mention only the most accepted ones. Make citizens as secure as possible; this means that good police services need to be managed by people who are not war criminals. Provide stable, but soft borders that people can cross readily. Disarm instead of rearm the fighters. Do not hold elections until a free press has been functioning for some time, to cover the positions of democratic opposition parties. Do not permit war criminals and nationalistic demagogues to run for office. If they do run, and are elected, do not accept them as legitimate on that basis alone.

There are strong disagreements over some of the possible lessons — especially the question of whether borders should ever be changed. Galtung would open that possibility. Denitch would not. Both might agree, however on this: The peacekeepers who are present in Bosnia must expect to stay there a long time if the Dayton Accords are to become the basis for a permanent peace.

### IV CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD CANADA DO?

It is not useful to conclude by recapitulating the whole list of lessons that have already been proposed. Two lessons stand out, both of which are endorsed, so far as I can see, by all the speakers.

<sup>28</sup>This will hardly happen so long as "ethnic cleansers" are in power. Soft borders would enable refugees to return home, defeating the whole purpose of the fighting.