

Given its economic dimension, the Kaliningrad problem does not lend itself to military cooperation alone, so it is encouraging that Moscow and the EU have reached a compromise on visa controls for Russian citizens in Kaliningrad who, once the Baltic states join the EU, will have to travel through Lithuania and then Belarus or Latvia to in order to reach any other part of Russia by land.²⁶ In light of the unique circumstance of Kaliningrad NATO and the EU have a good deal of diplomatic work before them, and the work of the latter in “societal security” will over the long term be more important than innovative military arrangements.²⁷ A good deal of this is already underway. Promoting economic renewal while fighting crime resulting from social decay in Kaliningrad are goals of the joint multilateral efforts of the EU and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)²⁸

²⁶ “EU seen approving compromise on Kaliningrad,” *Russia Journal Daily*, October 23, 2002.
http://www.russiajournal.com/print/russia_news_28050.html See the *Joint Statement on Transit between the Kaliningrad Region and the Rest of the Russian Federation* issued by the Tenth EU-Russia Summit, of November 11, 2002 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_11_02/js_kalin.htm

²⁷ Graeme P. Herd and Joan Löfgren, “Societal Security, the Baltic States and EU Integration,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.3, no.3, 2001, pp.273-296; Peer Lange, “Das Baltikum als eine Aufgabe für die integrative Gestaltung Europas,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B37/1998, pp.3-13

²⁸ The CBSS membership includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. On the EU’s approach to Kaliningrad see: Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU and Kaliningrad*, Brussels January 17, 2001.