

signals to warring parties that international assistance is conditional, and that the flow of assistance will vary according to behaviour.

No party in central Africa should be permitted to believe that assistance - political, food, reconstruction or security - will continue to flow in the absence of progress. In particular, the political elites of each group must be made to understand very clearly that they will be held responsible for failure. What the international community may consider a "forgiving" or "realistic" approach, could be seen on the ground as - literally - a license to kill. For example, had donors held the Habyarimana government to its promise to implement the Arusha accords in December 1993, instead of continuing assistance when this deadline for implementation had passed, events might have developed very differently in Rwanda in 1994. By allowing the then GOR to avoid or delay its obligations under Arusha, however, the international community may have given hardliners the impression that there would be no real consequences for failure to comply with promises made.

It is also vital that the international community speak with one voice: where there is a true concert, pressure can result in meaningful changes; where there is division, the parties on the ground will exploit it to their advantage.

II. Short-Term Measures: Close the Camps

Reasons to close quickly

The refugee camps, at least in Zaire, should be closed. This proposal is premised on:

- 1) the urgency of the situation. The potential for an explosion of violence is very real: now is the time to take action;
- 2) the unavailability of sufficient troops and financing by the UN for a new Zaire operation, at least in the near future, together with the difficulty in agreeing on and having accepted by Zaire, Rwanda and others an appropriate mandate. The delays in mounting a new UN operation may be fatal, as they were in April;
- 3) The current Secretary-General's recommendation for a two year operation is unlikely to attract much support and, in any case, it is counter-productive to allow the camps to exist for such a lengthy period;

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