demonstrating once again that, with many MIRVed missiles deployed, the warhead ceiling dominates the calculation. It might also be noted that lower launcher levels pose problems for military planners concerned with the counter-force capabilities, since there are fewer silos to be attacked by the counter-force capable warheads of the opposing side.

Table 11

Current Soviet Ballistic Missile Forces

Launchers		Warheads
ICBM	1393	6415
SLBM	979	2899
	2372	9314
Launcher ceiling 1250+		Warhead ceiling 4500 (ICBM subceiling 3,000)
300 SS-18 (10 warheads)		3,000
137 SS-N-18 (7 warheads)		957
60 SS-N-20 (9 warheads)		540
(197)		(1497)
Total 497		4497

In the US case, the need to maintain as high a launcher ceiling as possible suggested that the US might choose to retain their older but improved Minuteman II launchers. The warhead ceilings pose much more severe problems to the Soviets, as Table 11 indicates. Lacking accurate, single warhead missiles from its older inventory, the Soviet Union quickly exhausts the ICBM warhead sub-ceiling, using only 300 SS-18s. Although certain trade-offs with the SS-19 are conceivable, these trade-offs do little to solve the Soviet dilemma. In order to increase the number of launchers therefore, one must presume that the Soviets would place increasing value on the SS-25 single warhead mobile missile now starting to be deployed. At this point, however, the issue of the proposed American ban on new mobile missiles arises.