

Preface

With the rapid evolution of events in Europe, a new climate of East-West co-operation on security-related matters has emerged as the hallmark of the last years of the 1980s and the early part of the 1990s. This spirit of collaboration has already marked the arms control and disarmament process as exemplified by the bilateral Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 and the multilateral Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990. The Stockholm Document of 1986 and the Vienna Document of 1990, both dealing with confidence- and security-building aspects of arms control, add a further dimension.

As an essential element of arms control agreements, the process of verification cannot help but be affected by these dramatic developments; this will continue throughout the decade. Exactly how these ongoing trends in arms control are likely to evolve and their impact on verification remains to be seen.

The genesis of this research project was the desire to explore in an innovative manner the new requirements, challenges and opportunities likely to face the verification process in the 1990s. With this objective in mind, four distinguished scholars — two American and two Canadian — were invited to come together and focus on the following specific tasks:

- to identify trends with respect to the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements (including confidence building), both bilateral and multilateral;
- to outline how these trends may be expected to evolve to the year 2000; and
- to suggest profitable areas for further research in the field.

The following report is the culmination of their efforts. It represents an innovative, insightful and rigorous attempt to examine developments over the next 10 years with respect to verifying arms control and disarmament agreements in both the bilateral and multilateral fields.

This report is also significant as an example of Canadian and American co-operative research in this important area. In the past, the Verification Research Program has undertaken co-operative projects, on a government-to-government level, with several other countries including the United States. This project, however, represents one of the first times that representatives from Canadian and American industry, academia and government have come together under the auspices of the Verification Research Program. The results of this joint effort are, therefore, particularly interesting and satisfying.

The central objective of Canada's Verification Research Program is to contribute to the process of achieving verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements that will improve the security of Canada and its allies. As part of this objective, the program seeks to contribute to improved understanding of questions that relate to verification. With this goal in mind, the report is being made available to specialists in this field. It should provide useful guidance for what promises to be an exciting decade in terms of international security and arms control verification.