

of the proposed scheme that the pernicious system of calling for volunteers on every occasion of a corps embarking for foreign service, in order to bring up its strength to its colonial establishment, which is so hateful to every well wisher of the army, would for ever disappear. It is evident, however, that these anticipations have not as yet any chance of being realised. Let us take, for example, as an instance of what is continually going on, the case of the 35th Regiment, which embarked from Dublin for Jamaica last week. Previous to embarkation the strength of this corps had to be brought up, as usual, to its colonial establishment. According to the original intention of the new scheme, as described in the three reports of the "Committee on Organisation," which were drawn up in 1872 and 1873, a regiment going on foreign service was to draw for any additional men it might require both on its linked battalion and on its depot brigade. We were assured, moreover, that of each pair of battalions one was always to be abroad, while the other was at home, and it is plain indeed that, if this rule be not adhered to, the plan of making the home battalion supply the battalion on foreign service with recruits could not be carried out. But in the present instance the linked battalion of the 35th—viz, the 107th—is, for some reason or other, at Madras. Naturally, therefore, not a man was procurable from that source, while the brigade depot, which is at Chichester, was as might be expected, wholly unable to supply the required number of men. The consequence of this state of affairs was that the system of volunteering had to be resorted to, and appears, indeed, in spite of our promised new organisation, to be flourishing in full force. Volunteers from numbers of different regiments were called for for the 35th, and were sent on to Dublin at the eleventh hour, so that, on their final inspection before embarkation on the 12th instant, the major general commanding the division, instead of seeing before him a corps completely clothed and equipped, had to review a regiment made up to its complement by some two hundred men or so clothed in the different uniforms of their own corps which they had just left. Nor is the case of the 35th Regiment by any means an exceptional one. At the present moment the 33rd is under orders for India, and during the last week or ten days orders have been sent to call for volunteers from different regiments in order to complete this corps to its established strength. In this case also the linked battalion, which is the 76th, is also in India, while the brigade depot, which is to be at Halifax, is not yet formed. The present War Office administration can scarcely be held responsible for the present state of affairs, inasmuch as they have, for the present at any rate, to make the best of the very awkward legacy they have inherited from their predecessors. The legacy is, there is too much reason to fear, a disorganised army and an unworkable system. This result is an eminently unsatisfactory one for the taxpayers of the country, who have during the last few years paid such large sums on the strength of the assurance that in process of time they would have in return for their money a system of organisation upon which the country could rely. If, during ordinary times of peace, such shifts as these have to be resorted to, what would be our position if, in the course of the next five years, the country were surprised by a sudden outbreak of war?"

England has a long catalogue of disasters to balance Lord CARDWELL's heroic's and Mr. GLADSTONE's rhetoric.

The great event of the day is the purchase by the British Government of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. Of the 400,000 shares into which the original stock in that speculation was divided by its originator, M. DE LESSEPS, the great French Engineer, 177,000 were held by the ruler of Egypt. The recent bankruptcy of his Suzorain, the SULTAN, and the threatening collapse of Egyptian Finance, which appears to have been managed in the usual fashion of semi-civilized Governments, are quite sufficient reasons why the KHEDIVÉ should seek the readiest way of solving a difficult problem without any deep political motives, although it is quite possible that those lie below the surface.

The English press are quite jubilant over the boldness displayed by English statesmen on this occasion, and it is well for her interests as it is for those of humanity in general that statesmen and not "rhetoricians" held the helm of state during this great crisis.

A conviction has forced itself on the minds of the British people that it would be necessary in view of future European complications, to acquire complete control of the Suez Canal as requisite for the maintenance of her Indian Empire, and the seizure of Egypt was openly advocated. Consequently the acquisition in a peaceful and legitimate manner of a controlling influence in the Canal will deprive after political movements of any appearance of mere selfish aggression. But how the folly of the Whig Radicals becomes apparent, Mr. GLADSTONE in the plenitude of his wisdom abandoned the command of the Adriatic by surrendering the Ionian Islands to Greece—a power wholly unequal to the task of even governing them—and as a consequence, England, if she seizes Egypt, will also be obliged to seize Syria and erect the Turkish Provinces of Asia Minor into a Protectorate of some kind in order to counter balance Russian acquisitions at Constantinople. For this purpose, the line of the Caucasus from Anapa on the Black Sea, to Cape Apsheron on the Caspian, would be a natural and proper boundary, for it will not be consistent with the peace of the world to allow Russia to make a private Lake of the Black Sea; a consummation by the way Mr. GLADSTONE and his foreign Secretary did their best to further.

A glance at a map will show that with some arrangement of this kind Russian progress in Central Asia would be merely the march of Russian civilization, which the "Euphrates Valley Railway and its adjuncts" would circumscribe within due bounds.

It cannot be denied, however, that the questions raised by this action of the British Government are fearfully complicated by the insane folly of their predecessors, and the possession of the "Ionian Islands" seems to be a necessary factor in solving the difficult political problems to which the purchase of the Suez Canal will give rise.

"The purchase by Great Britain of a controlling interest in the stock of the Suez Canal Company, is the first decisive step in Oriental affairs that has been taken by that nation for many years. Taken in connection with the nervous anxiety constantly displayed by England, as to Russian influence in Central Asia, and the hitherto unprecedented visit of the Prince of Wales to India, it means a probable English station before many years at Suez, and a possible future occupation of Egypt. The foresight of the first Napoleon, eighty years ago, perceived in Egypt the proper gateway to India, and at this late date England recognizes the justice of his reasoning by paying a heavy price for the interest in question. The next Parliament will probably decide the question of whether this bargain shall be perfected and extended to ultimate ownership and occupation of the soil. Having begun, there is little doubt that England will go on until the end, and in that case the independence of the Khedive will probably be secured as to Turkey, although how long it will last as to England is a different question. American officers of the Khedive are not likely to find their position improved in such an event, and if it came to a fight, the recent advices from Alexandria, if the same should prove entirely reliable, indicate that the Egyptian troops are not to be depended upon, a whole brigade, 1,200 strong, having been recently slaughtered by the same cowardly and undisciplined Abyssinians, who broke like sheep before Napier's little band of Englishmen. It is probable that there were no American officers in this detachment, as all of them have been hitherto occupied on higher Staff duties, not in command of troops. Judging from the tenor of the recent telegrams, it is plain that English interference in the affairs of the East looks bolder to-day than it has ever since the struggle between Clive and La Bourdonnais, a century ago."

The foregoing paragraph from the United States Army and Navy Journal, of 4th December, shews how the most striking Coup d'Etat of the present day is viewed by our neighbours.

It does not strike us, however, as being a matter of necessity for England to interfere with the administration of Egyptian affairs or the Independence of the KHEDIVÉ, further than is necessary to see that the finances of the country are judiciously and economically expended, and that an end is put to the oppression of the Fellaheen or peasant farmers. If this was done the transference of the Suzerainty would be a real blessing to the people and would make, or go a long way towards making Egypt again the granary of Europe. It is to be hoped her present action will have immediate effect in compelling a reduction in the military and naval expenditure of the Government, but we fail to see in what way it will affect the condition of American officers in the employ of the KHEDIVÉ, except indeed, that cast iron oath of allegiance which disgraces the statute books of the United States would compel those soldiers of fortune to decline service under a British Sovereign, although quite willing to accept it under an eastern despot. Otherwise, if England did annex this country their experience might be worth having, if it was even of a less heroic kind than what