

plied—emulation, praise, censure, forms of disgrace, confinement, impositions — the necessity for corporal punishment should be nearly done away with. . . . The presence of pupils that are not amenable to such means is a discord and an anomaly, and the direct remedy would consist in removing them to some place where the lower natures are grouped together. Inequality of moral tone is as much to be deprecated in a class as inequality of intellectual advancement. There should be Reformatories, or special institutions, for those that cannot be governed "like the majority" (p. 116). Our author is not a full believer in the discipline of consequences as enunciated by Herbert Spencer. He remarks forcibly enough that the results of misconduct may be too serious to be used for discipline, when the want of foresight and foreknowledge in children prevent them from realizing consequences while the evil impulse is upon them. But the sense of consequences may be greatly strengthened by constantly keeping before the minds of the young the direct relation between cause and effect in human action, so well expressed in regard to wrong-doers by the inexorable Bible truth, that if they "sow the wind they must reap the whirl-wind."

The fourth chapter is devoted to the discussion of the terms employed. Although Mr. Bain attaches so much importance to memory for knowledge imparted, he is, in this chapter, quite emphatic in fixing a limit to its improvement, asserting that it cannot be greatly strengthened but at the expense of reason, judgment, and imagination, which is not a desirable result" (p. 121).

He discusses the meanings that are attached to synthesis, analysis, and object lessons, remarking upon the last that the "cultivation of the senses" is a more suitable way to describe them. In distinguishing between information and training, he places under the head of the first, the elementary operations of arithmetic, the definitions and rules of grammar, and historical and geographical facts; while under the head of the latter he places elocution, or voice culture, geometry, or culture in deductive method,

the physical and natural history sciences, or culture in induction and classification, and thus sums up his remarks: "While the mere facts of science turned to account in practical operations are called information, the *method* of science, the systematic construction of it, the power of concatenating and deriving truths from other truths, is treated as something distinct and superior" (p. 129).

In the two following chapters, devoted to "Educational Values," we have not to read far before we find that of the two great branches of human culture—Science and Language—his opinion is decidedly in favour of the former. He regards it as the most perfect embodiment of truth, and the best means of impressing the mind with the "labour and precaution necessary to prove a thing." It is the grand corrective of the laxness of the natural man in receiving un-accredited facts and conclusions. Science, he says, "exemplifies the devices for establishing a fact, or a law, under every variety of circumstances; it saps the credit of everything that is affirmed without being properly attested (p. 147).

Hence it is as inveterate a foe to superstition as the morning light was believed to be to the nocturnal visitations of ghosts or the horrid incantations of witches.

Of Languages he asks—"If we are not to use a language at all, or very little, as is the case with the majority of those that learn. Latin and Greek at school and college, is there any reason for undergoing the labour?" He follows this question up by the assertion that the only justification for learning a language is that it may be used to receive or convey information" (p. 168).

When treating of the sequence of subjects, which he does in the next two chapters, in answer to the question, at what age should education commence? he says: "The necessity of protracting the age to six or seven cannot be made out" (p. 185). He is of opinion it should begin at five.

The order of training should be, he insists, from the concrete to the abstract, from the simple to the complex, and, from the partic-