

God demands my obedience, and I have a subjective sense of "oughtness" that I should render it. This sense of the First Class has been aroused within me by the Divine command. I cannot divest myself of its impulse, and it will not be pacified until I comply with its behest and put myself in pacifying relations. But my own relation to the Divine command would not alone arouse this subjective sense of "oughtness" within me; it would be excited in precisely the same manner at the thought of any other creature disobeying God. Then while I am in this state other subjective senses of the First Class may act upon me. The thought of failure on my part arouses a strong condemnatory feeling against such a course—or the thought of compliance, a deep sentiment of approbateness in favour of it. Also, a subjective apprehensiveness of punishment, springing out of the same excitant, may warn me of the fearful consequences. However, this great mental conflict, kept up, it may be, on the one side, by subjective senses of the conscience, and on the other by some strongly insubordinate subjective feeling of the "Heart," may terminate in favour of the latter, and I disobey. Instantly my own conduct arouses within me a strong subjective disapprobateness against myself—a sense of ill-desert, or even that of remorse or despair, so forcibly described by the Apostle Paul, when speaking of the reprobate, "to whom there remaineth no more hope, but a fearful looking for of judgment."

It may be said of subjective senses of the conscience, in common with all others; that some of their number have a greater or less tendency to associate in excitement with certain others, or even to produce it. This is so clear that we need scarcely cite examples.

The work of the Imagination (see Def.) in the excitement or pacification of subjective senses of the conscience, is in general precisely similar to the service it performs in connection with subjective senses of the "Heart."

Its merely fictitious conceptions never produce deep feeling or pacify it. Yet their power is strong enough to make us susceptible of the existence and bent of such feelings, or to suggest relations of pacification which, by reason, we seek means of reducing to verities. Though incapable of arousing much feeling, yet in virtue of the power and readiness of the imagination in creating fictitious conceptions of objects in either exciting or pacifying character or relations, in both ways it does an important service.

For other particulars respecting the subjective feelings or senses of conscience, we refer the reader to the accompanying Table. (See Table C.)

The Subjective Senses or Feelings of the Will.

These senses differ in character considerably from those which we have been discussing in the preceding pages, in the fact that though states of the mind, they are entirely devoid of emotion, and cannot be said to possess either desire or aversion, pain or pleasure, impulse of obligation, or, indeed, impulse of any kind. Their relation to the other subjective feelings is such, that all other feelings seek the gratification or pacification of their impulse through them. And though these feelings in their own nature are immobile or stolid, they are all excited to action through the medium of others.

In discussing the other subjective senses or feelings, we spoke of the two relations which they sustain to outward things (that is, to conceptions of outward things), viz., the relation of excitement and the relation of gratification or pacification.

The subjective feelings of the Will sustain relations to outward things parallel to the other feelings, in this respect; but of course, from the nature of the feelings themselves, somewhat different.

They have their exciting relation and their resolving or consensative relation. The last relation we call "resolving" or "consensative," because, though the feeling, being different in its nature, cannot gratify or pacify, by a conception of a certain character or relation, it can be "resolutive" or "consensative" to it. The subjective feelings of the Will, then, have their relation of excitement and their relation of resolve or consent.

The more important of these subjective feelings or senses of the Will—for the list is very brief—are indecision, consent, and non-consent. But the subjective energy put forth is not one of them, being not a subjective state of the mind at all, but an act (physical or otherwise) which is a mere result of the subjective state of consent, and which will be discussed under the head of Will. The subjective feelings of the Will are just such as they require to be, conservative of their states, cool or devoid of feeling or desire, and will only excite to action by the presentation of the strongest motive.

As the action of these subjective senses will be discussed under the head of Will, no more need be said concerning them at present.

The Subjective Senses or Feelings of the Intellect.

The subjective senses of the Intellect—that is, of knowledge which is obtained by perception or inception—are doubt and assurance, which, like those of the Will, are mental states,