

eagerness to promote change through serious negotiation. As it is, several authors are clearly and admirably more concerned with resolving than with managing the conflict; these include Rod Byers, William Zartman, and, surprisingly, the Israeli co-editor, Gabriel Ben-Dor. Also indifferent to the management motif, and political science jargon, are a number of excellent studies of the bilateral relations of pairs of Middle East countries, notably Iran-Iraq by Mark Heller, Libya-Egypt by Haim Shaked and Yehudit Ronen, and Syria-Israel by Itamar Rabinowich. These authors rely heavily on the personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders to explain the interactions of the regional actors.

In contrast, Michael Brecher and Patrick James make a valiant effort to explain Middle East crises by rigorous political science and quantitative data. The results are unexciting, even though they examine about fifty cases. Moreover, as the authors concede that the data analysis is "exploratory," and the "basis for aggregation largely intuitive," it comes as a surprise to read in the conclusion that "we have acquired a reliable basis for anticipating the profile of future crises."

Edward Azar and Renée Marlin also employ quantitative data, this time to establish the not surprising conclusion that the social cost of protracted conflict in Lebanon is appallingly high. The book's particular purpose might have been better served if Azar had contributed a report from his imaginative workshops on Middle East negotiation.

Although Steven Speigel ignores the weight of domestic inputs in explaining US policies in the Middle East, his chapter is informative and balanced. So too is Neil MacFarlane's study of the role of the USSR. It has often, he shows, promoted restraint in the area, especially in its relations with Syria.

The excellent chapter on arms transfers by Keith Krause suggests that these have had little impact on the behavior of the Middle East recipients. Krause supports MacFarlane's conclusion that the USSR must have a prominent seat at the table when serious peace negotiations are undertaken.

Is it too much to hope that this will happen soon after the fall elections in the world's strongest democracy? And also after this fall's election in Israel, the little country whose excessively democratic constitution has until now greatly impeded its ability to take tough decisions?

Crisis management does occur in the real world, and its study can be rewarding both for understanding and for improving policies. It may even, as the editors argue, enhance the prospects for permanent solutions, but conflict resolution can too easily become a cover for perpetuating an unstable state of affairs. Scholars should still give first priority to conflict resolution.

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Before the White Paper

by David Lord

The Canadian Strategic Review 1985-1986 edited by R.B. Byers and Michael Slack. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1988, 199 Pages.

Better late than never for *The Canadian Strategic Review 1985-1986*, which finally emerged this summer. Editors R.B. Byers, senior fellow at York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies, and Michael Slack, the Centre's research and administrative coordinator, have assembled the book in two parts — a readable, fairly detailed and informative section titled, "The International Security Environment," as well as a briefer but still substantial section titled "Canadian National Security Issues." The complete *Review* is a valuable reference work for the period in question, particularly the portion on Canadian developments.

For the world strategic overview, James MacIntosh, a senior research associate with the Centre, has produced two chapters on Soviet-American relations and arms control developments. Co-editor Slack and John Willis, a Centre research associate, provide chapters on alliance issues and defence economic trends. NATO developments are presented by country, clearly and concisely.

Opening the section on Canadian issues, Byers contributes a chapter reviewing the failure of the Conservative government in meeting election promises of substantially increased defence spending and a speedy White Paper examination of the country's defence policy. The main reason for the lack of action in pursuing new directions in defence policy is evident in the record of

the rapid turnover of ministers and associate ministers in the first twenty-two months after the 1984 election. By the end of 1986, the fourth ministerial appointee, Perrin Beatty, was still more than five months away from publishing the long-awaited White Paper.

As for the examination of foreign policy, Byers gives high marks to parliamentarians for hearing and synthesizing a wide range of divergent views on Canada's role in the world, but takes the government to task for not carrying out a consolidated "security review" that would have produced a comprehensive outline of the country's economic, foreign policy and defence goals. He also suggests that despite the success of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations in dealing with such contentious issues as Canada's relations with the US, the Strategic Defense Initiative, trade liberalization, development aid and human rights in its report (*Independence and Internationalism*), the necessity of an overriding "security policy" apparently was not accepted by the bureaucracy or the cabinet.

In reviewing specific Canadian defence developments for the 2-year period, Martin Shadwick yields a more readable and pertinent commentary than the Department of National Defence has managed to do in its annual reviews. Of particular interest is a detailed section on the substantial but frequently overlooked search-and-rescue activities of the Canadian Armed Forces.

In the final chapter, on defence economics, Willis argues that in 1985 and 1986, despite election campaign promises of 5 percent real growth in defence expenditures, the fledgling Conservative government apparently put the "deficit cart before the defence policy horse," allowing only a 1.2 percent real increase in estimated defence spending for 1986-87. On defence production policy, Willis points out that despite the government's "declaratory rhetoric," little desire had been shown to develop a domestic defence capacity.

Unfortunately for those who keep a close watch on strategic and defence developments, reading the 1985-86 review may seem like plowing old ground; an at-times irritating exercise when one comes across contemporary speculation — "When will the government produce its White Paper on Defence?" "Will the superpowers be able to come to an agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces?" (That one has been answered since 1986)