is descrupulously held to the terms of the llists agreements signed with our country? If we ed to vefused it our continued technological ng definisistance, would this not amount to e numberiving it of indispensable support in atomic atters of peaceful nuclear co-operation? ır policimilarly, could Pakistan not take umainty oage at any suspension of Canadian assisng that nee, when it could in no way be held wing the ponsible for the Canada-India misady wel anture? Lastly, can we reasonably doubt to do so e good faith of Japan, which has ens in the red into major agreements with our reasonimentry in matters of technology and tural resources? Besides, is Japan not y results of Canada's chief economic partners?

All this is true, but we forget that in cy as otion autting forward these arguments we are nt - neaking the language of national interest. - by that is the third paradox of our policy, . Let uscause the hard line, as some neutrals vernmen ve seen, and as some so-called comaction in tted countries have also discovered, does that it itlend itself to compromise. In trying to ers that on the fence by being against proliferapromise on while still accepting the risk involved ssistance co-operating with countries that have is not it ratified the 1968 treaty, we shall ngs are ubtless continue to get along, but the als coulakening will probably be much more trary), tutal than in 1974, if and when a country the Canooses the nuclear option.

to follow It is probable that the language of policy tional interest, or of so-called "realistic" ate with licy, also involves a certain responsibility na, which the part of the political authorities to eration form the Canadian people of the true suspectagnitude of the stakes. There is a signifint gap between what we are actually does not ving and doing these days, and the idea y out the Canadian public has of what we are tly or wying and doing. If we speak this way howeve, w, perhaps it is because Canada is no nate suspinger the economically weak country it the objectioned to be just a few years ago.

reaty. By clear assis nadian safeguards

used up to December 1974, seven months after the the basican nuclear test, the Canadian Governs implicit announced through its Minister of low probalersy, Mines and Resources, Donald which is acdonald, that the safeguards on Canacountries in nuclear co-operation would henceis an inoth apply not only to the export of argumentionable materials but to all nuclear e entirely imment and technology of Canadian does no gin. Thus we performed the double feat countries, keeping a clear conscience and preventperfectly the manufacture of other indigenous est, and ilctors that would be the fruit of Canaached for technology. We know, for example, s on nuclest India is in the process of constructing not be no hat cour to RAPP reactor.

The controls insisted on by Canada are thus much stricter, because more allembracing, than these required by the IAEA. However strict the controls, it was still abundantly clear that Canada could not escape reproach for continuing its nuclear co-operation with countries that had given no sign of ratifying the nonproliferation treaty. We therefore took advantage of the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, held in May 1975, to tighten Canadian policy on nuclear co-operation. At that time, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, stated that, in future: "Canadian bilateral official developmentassistance commitments for the financing of nuclear projects will be undertaken solely to non-proliferation treaty party states". Furthermore, added the Minister, adherence to the treaty would be "an important factor in reaching decisions on the provision of Canadian Government export financing in the nuclear field".

In other words, no country that has not ratified the non-proliferation treaty will be able to take advantage of the Canadian nuclear-technology assistance programs if that country requests Canadian financing for the purpose. However, if no financing is involved, the request will be considered, although it is improbable that it will be followed up since Canada's preference will go to countries that have

already adhered to the treaty.

Canada has thus managed to define, step by step, four categories of country. This is not saying very much, but it is most revealing about the extraordinary political imagination of Canadians! In the first category there is only India - since that is the only country with which our bilateral co-operation agreements preceded not only the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but even the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the second category are countries like Pakistan, Spain and Argentina, which are not parties to the treaty but which continue to benefit from Canadian assistance in the form of technology or equipment. The third category is that of the poor countries that have not yet adhered to the treaty and are excluded at the moment from the list of our potential customers when they do not fall in with the prevailing ideology regarding non-proliferation. Lastly, there is the category of rich countries that have not signed the treaty and could undoubtedly purchase Canadian nuclear reactors without finding themselves in the humiliating position of having to request Canadian financing. The door is, therefore, not perCanadianpreference will go to adhering countries