ecognition by the . Taine himself vas simply a defisomething "variethere can be no as a general idea. the only definite o reference of an d symbol. What for it is the only to speak at this be used as a symfallacy. To the distinguish differualities which are as we have seen, is stage. Hence, n which they indic image is all the lse. We do put it

child's developwe should expect, words, and in their en reproduce the ress themselves in eature of all is that and definite.

d one reaction in

e most interesting f the childish conthe application of nuch too widely; uire in the young sting, also, to note in the determinad calls the moon a pubbles, and other round objects; calls everything 'bow-wow' which bears any sort of resemblance to a dog (including bronze dogs on the staircase, and the goat in the yard); applies his word 'papa' and 'mamma' to all men and all women, respectively; makes his word 'cutie' do duty, not only for 'knife,' but also for 'scissors,' 'shears,' 'sickle,' etc; says 'bà' (bath) on seeing a crust dipped in tea; applies 'ati' (asses) to 'chair,' 'footstool,' 'bench,' 'sitting down,' 'sit down,' etc.; it is evident that one great striking resemblance has overshadowed all differences in the object."

This whole paragraph illustrates the point which we made above in regard to the "concept." The childish "concepts" are no concepts at all. Differences exist in the objects only for us. Hence, what we take to be the reference of a vague recognition of similarities in objects to different objects, is not all indicative of the true state of things in the child's mind. What he really has in mind is an indefinite image. Given stimulations which have any similarity at all, as we conceive them, the child interprets in one way. That is, to the child there is but one stimulus, one reaction, one object, viz., an experience sufficiently differentiated to be grasped as a totality, and to be recognized in and through itself. The child has not yet got to a stage where its experience, or life, is sufficiently differentiated to admit of a conscious recognition and reference of parts in a whole. This stage, however, is reached in some children just before the end of this period. Short sentences are used, in which only the prominent ideas appear. The full meaning of the stage is seen in the period ranging from the eighteenth to the twenty-fourth month. Preyer records at this period, "the greatest progress, however, is indicated by the combination of two words into a sentence." The two words really used are a noun and a verb. Here we see that the immediately recognized situation which was formed out of the chaotic totality of early conscious experience has itself become so differentiated that unity in differences must be consciously recognized within the former totality. A dualism has appeared, which is represented on the intellectual side in the discursive judgment through the development of the nominal and verbal tendencies.

But this is not all. Simple imitation, which was expressed in the circular reaction of early life, gradually passed over into persistent imitation. This, when once differentiated, developed rapidly, showing itself in the more complete apprehension of meaning, and in the development of control. In this period an independence of activity quite

Italics mine.