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practical to adapt present aircraft to this new role. Past experience shows that to have attempted to design and build a new aircraft in Canada would have been prohibitive in cost and would have taken much longer to become operational.

I mentioned a few minutes ago that to understand the estimates one must know what our policy and commitments are. For the benefit of those who have not read "Defence 1959", I would quote from that paper:

Canadian defence policy derives directly from our foreign policy and is designed to ensure national security and the preservation of world peace.

The Deputy Chairman: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the minister, but I have to advise him that his time has expired. Has the minister unanimous consent to continue?

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

Mr. Pearkes: I continue with the quotation:

These objectives are reached through collective arrangements within NATO and the United Nations. While the increased range of offensive weapons equipped with nuclear warheads brings the North American continent within the target area in any future war, it is realized that the defence of this area cannot be considered in isolation. The advantage in collective defence within the framework of an alliance such as NATO is that an integrated balanced force can be provided by each member nation concentrating on the provision of those elements which constitute its particular needs and can be most effectively maintained.

In order to meet the objectives of the alliance and in support of the United Nations, it is the defence policy of Canada to provide forces for: The defence against an attack on the North American content; the collective defence and deterrent forces of NATO in Europe and the north Atlantic; the United Nations to assist that organization in attaining its peaceful aims.

It should be understood that since the development of offensive weapons has not been matched by comparable advances in defensive technology, effective retaliatory forces are still the best and perhaps only defence. That is part of the concept of NATO.

If the deterrent is to be effective it must contain four basic elements. The free world must have forces in being, fully trained and immediately available for action. They must be so organized as to be able to repel and counter any attack. We must also have the will to build up and maintain those forces and the determination to employ them if circumstances warrant; and the potential enemy must be convinced of the strength of our forces and our willingness to use them if required. Some of the exaggerated statements regarding the obsolescence of some of our equipment have not been helpful in that respect.

While realizing that the main deterrent to war is the retaliatory forces, we must continue to maintain a good defensive posture. For one thing, we must protect the offensive forces, such as the SAC bomber bases, from destruction by a surprise attack. Protection against such an eventuality is one of the principal roles of our air defence forces on the North American continent. The aim of the western alliance is, first of all, to deter the outbreak of war. Should this fail and an attack follow, we must be in a position to defend ourselves and to destroy the enemy's ability to continue to wage war.

I turn now to defence against the manned bomber. Despite the diminishing threat of the manned bomber in the years ahead, to which I have already referred, it has been considered sensible to maintain defences against such a form of attack on this continent. With the development of stand-off bombs launched from manned aircraft, it is imperative that the interception of such aircraft should take place as far distant from the target as possible. To accomplish this and to provide defence in depth, Canadian and United States interceptors would engage enemy bombers as far north as possible.

We are maintaining nine squadrons of CF-100 all-weather interceptors and are making arrangements so that United States interceptors can operate in Canadian air space, and consideration is being given to providing facilities so that United States aircraft may be able to operate from Canadian airfields. Those hostile bombers that succeed in escaping these defences would then be engaged by a series of Bomarc units located close to the Canadian-United States border. In other words, we are concerned with area rather than point defence. The United States are providing some point defences at their key strategic bases, SAC bomber bases, by such missiles as the Nike-Hercules.

As we are participating jointly with the United States in the air defence of North America under NORAD, it is only good sense to equip our air defence forces with similar weapons so as to permit the most effective joint operation. The United States air force, faced with the same requirement for an area air defence missile, are developing the Bomarc as a weapon so as to complement the other elements of the defence system against bomber aircraft; the radar warning system is also being developed, interceptor aircraft and the semi-automatic ground environment.

Two Bomarc B units will be stationed in Canada, one near North Bay, Ontario, and one in northern Quebec, as part of a system