Bao, and having done that they have to sup- to find greater means of destruction in the port him or suffer another loss of prestige. Thus we who wish Bao well may find that whether we like it or not we have become mixed up in a civil war in this country in southeast Asia; and that is a great and grave responsibility for us to undertake. Once again we seem to have been manoeuvred into the support of a regime whose only merit is that it is anti-communist; and that is not a good enough way either to contain or defeat communism. This is a distinct testing ground if ever there was one; and if we wish to see Bao successful he will require something more than good wishes. The western world will have to realize that it has material obligations to him as well.

Perhaps if the minister is going to close this debate he will be able to enlighten us still further as to what happened at the Ceylon conference when the majority of the commonwealth members agreed to recognize Bao but Mr. Nehru held out against them on the ground, which I think was good and sufficient, that Bao's position is something more than precarious.

In his speech the minister dealt with another matter that is worthy of careful thought. He gave us a résumé of Russian proposals for the control of the atomic bomb and pointed out that there has been no significant change in the Russian position over the last two or three years. Two things are obvious. In the first place the Baruch plan-I call it that though it has been amended—is not acceptable to Russia. In the second place they are not prepared to agree to full-time inspection. That is not a new position but one they have taken right from the beginning; and these are facts which must be considered. In his remarks the minister said Vishinsky's proposal does not give us that security under international control which is essential if we are to sign any international agreement. That is true; it does not give us very much security. But there is no security at all today; and perhaps even the most limited degree of security will offer a little more hope than the nothing we now possess. Since Russia obviously has the atomic bomb I suggest that there is less reason than ever for expecting her to accept the United States proposals which were put forward two or three years ago.

What then is going to be our answer to this Russian refusal? We must have some answer. Again the minister gave a glimmer of hope when he said we must keep open every road and every path in the search for survival. I think we may agree that today there is no complete defence against enemy attack; but unfortunately the only answer of the west is hope that we can make an enemy suffer more than we do. That is not the most constructive or most sensible approach to the problem. We in the west seem to be obsessed with the idea of increasing our military power under the illusion that it is going to make us safe. I maintain that it will do nothing of the sort; that if that is the extent of our answer to the Russian "no" there is no safety at all.

So we must have some sort of control, no matter how inadequate it may be. While I am not prepared to accept everything the Russians suggest, at the same time I do think we have to settle down a bit ourselves until we can find some common ground for discussion. We must find some sort of control not only over the atomic bomb but over the right to wage war. Even if Russia accepted the Baruch plan, can one say there is any fully proved method of achieving security under it? I doubt it, with a nation the size of Russia. So we have to start again.

There has been a change in tactics and also, in certain quarters, a change in outlook. I read an editorial in yesterday's Ottawa Journal commenting upon something which Mr. Lilienthal said in condemnation of certain scientists who feared that the advent of the hydrogen bomb might mean the end of the world. He called their statements intellectual nonsense. This editorial went further, and said that Hiroshima was a pin point in the world, and that even if the hydrogen bomb should be a hundred thousand times worse it could not be very much more devastating. Hiroshima was not a pin point, and here is surely an example of the moral stultification which many have reached. What happened at Hiroshima was that thousands of innocent people were murdered in the name of war. I do not attack the use of the bomb, nor do I defend it, but surely in heaven's name Hiroshima was something more than a pin point on this map. In the body physical a pin point may mean the beginning of a cancer which will cause death. In the body politic that sort of pin point may also lead ineluctably to the same sort of death. Hiroshima was not a mere pin point. Time after time in this same newspaper I have seen the editors invoking Christian beliefs; yet by their own moral paralysis they have shown that these beliefs have very little meaning to them, when they count the death of tens of thousands of innocent people as merely a pin point. That perhaps is an interpolation, yet I felt I had to say it.

I say there has to be a change in tactics. Containment in the negative sense obviously is not enough. Containment allied with a desire to improve the condition of peoples throughout the world might have worked, but I do not think we are doing quite enough to