

part of this undertaking. The standards also call for safeguards to be triggered by the transfer of technology for heavy-water production enrichment and reprocessing. Canadian policy, I should say parenthetically, places safeguards as well on reactor technology, which, as I understand it, was not agreed to for various reasons by the group suppliers.

It also sets out some of the areas where the government considers progress necessary for promoting non-proliferation, such as the promotion of regional fuel cycles. These are described in the background paper. The standard does not, as Canada would have wished, stipulate that safeguards be applied to the full nuclear program of the recipient country. Such a requirement is not, however, precluded and achievement of a consensus on this question may be a future result of efforts in the suppliers' group.

I have just given an exposition of Canada's position. This position, or policy is, of course, shared by the other supplier countries concerned about the problem. As the Prime Minister has stated, however, there has been no secret agreement or binding international treaty enforcing this standard. What there has been, as a result of consultation among senior technical officials, is a consensus decision expressed in unilateral form by a number of countries to accept certain safeguards principles in all cases of nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states, whether party to the NPT or not. More countries are likely, on the basis of review, to make such a decision.

The Canadian government has pressed, in its discussions, for the highest possible level of safeguards to be applied to all nuclear transfer. We are satisfied that much progress has been made as a result of this effort and that further progress can be made. It is one further stage in the evolution of the international safeguards system. The London club conclusions, as the suppliers' meetings have been called, have been a success. We have covered one of the difficulties that is encountered by a single country acting alone.

I have been invited to come clean in my explanation, and indeed I will be quite prepared to oblige because the situation with regard to India, or the question posed by our negotiations with India at the present time is a clear and easily understood question. The basic attitude I have taken in these negotiations is, in effect, what policy to be pursued by the government of Canada is in the best interests of non-proliferation in respect of India? I was going to make a political comment, but I had better not do so as my time is short. I will keep to the substance of the subject by saying that following the explosion in May, 1974, discussions have been held with the Indian government to ensure that existing safeguards on the RAPP reactor be strengthened, that the withdrawal of Canada from nuclear co-operation with India should not produce a collapse of the safeguards, and that India should carry out a responsible policy as a potential exporter of nuclear technology, material and equipment.