

PREFACE

This is the fourth and final report in a series which examines the potential contribution of collateral analysis to the consideration of issues related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

Canada is a Party to the BTWC and, furthermore, has participated in every exchange of information pursuant to the confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed by the States Parties in 1986 and subsequently revised and extended in 1991. It is clear, however, that more can be done to enhance transparency in relation to activities involving biological materials and toxins.

Since so much of the concern about biological and toxin weapons falls in the realm of dual-use technology, any detailed discussion of such matters must inevitably comprise an assessment -- a "picture" -- of States' technological capabilities. Only on such a basis can an informed discussion take place. It was with this in mind that Canada embarked upon the current series of studies of three States Parties (Iraq, Iran and Canada) and one non-party (Israel) to the BTWC. These countries were chosen because their levels of technological capability were considered to be demonstrably different as was indicated by a preliminary examination of scientific publication databases. Although the studies do not purport to be exhaustive, they can serve as useful reference points in undertaking a comparison of what can be accomplished through the use of collateral analysis. Collateral analysis is a low-technology means of verification which is available to all States Parties to the BWTC.

It must be absolutely clear from the outset that this paper does not address the question of biological and toxin warfare. It is about technology, research and the free flow of information. This case study uses "collateral analysis" to identify from the public literature the types of