

responsible for aerial and satellite reconnaissance.⁶¹ This functional division of labour might work well, as in the Sinai experience, where verification responsibilities are shared amongst different third parties as well as the parties to the agreement.

Of course, military disengagement plans and provisions for the operation of verification procedures for Central Europe are not novel. As early as 1955, a draft treaty on German reunification specified the adoption of zones of limited forces. The 1955 document called for "levels of armed forces which would be specified so as to establish a military balance"⁶² and the provision of radar warning systems to be operated by the Soviet and East Europeans in the Western part of the limited forces zone with a similar system in the Eastern part of the zone to be operated by NATO.

In 1958, the Soviets proposed the establishment of 28 jointly manned control points in Central Europe and an 800-km-wide zone for

aerial inspection along the East-West border. More recently, at the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna, there have been extensive discussions on the monitoring of entry/exit points for any agreed-upon reduction zone.⁶³ Perhaps most importantly, as a result of new developments in sensor technology, the Soviets might now find a verification system that involved remote sensing more acceptable politically than one predicated exclusively on a high degree of intrusiveness by inspectors or observers. As will be recalled from the Sinai experience, technology-intensive verification proved useful in circumventing problems of sovereignty.

To date, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have not altered their respective cost-benefit calculations for disengagement. Both sides still firmly believe that standing forces, and not reserve forces positioned far from the intra-German border, determine crisis stability, strengthen deterrence and allow for the exercise of territorial control. Nevertheless, despite the lack of movement toward large-scale disengagement of ground forces in Central Europe, manpower and financial constraints may ultimately compel both sides to seek alternative security arrangements that are more cost-effective and use less manpower. Buffer zones, together with verified zones of limited forces and early warning watch stations could provide part of the solution.

⁶¹ The idea of plurilateral verification is a variant of the multilateral variety, which refers specifically to verification undertaken by like-minded parties to an agreement. Plurilateral verification assumes the sovereign equality of all parties with respect to participating in the verification system. However, direct participation of all states in every aspect of verification activity — especially in the European context — could result in the duplication of capabilities and engender unworkably complex and cumbersome procedures. This problem may best be remedied by delegating certain verification tasks to a sub-group of the parties who possess the capabilities and willingness to perform these activities.

⁶² See C. Krause "Theory and Conception of CBM in East and West", Study for the Research Institute of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, FR Germany, 1980, pp. 16-17. Cited in D. Barton, "The Sinai Peacekeeping Experience".

⁶³ At the MBFR talks, both East and West have suggested that permanent entry/exit posts be established where observers from the opposite side could monitor movements of military units in and out of the region of reduction, in order to ascertain that the agreed level of forces was not violated. Any detected movement of military forces into the region of reduction through these entry/exit points that was not in accord with agreed ceilings could be construed as threatening. This growing concern with the operational side of arms control and verification in Europe has been reflected in recent efforts to link talks on conventional force reductions with the CSBM package produced at Stockholm on September 19, 1986. For an excellent discussion of the latter point see Richard E. Darilek, "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe", *Survival* (January/February 1987), pp. 5-21.

