

determining toxicity would be required.

As part of verifying the initial, and other, declarations, the rolling text provides for analysis of samples. Since the objective would be to confirm known and declared chemicals, instruments and procedures capable of such confirmation would already be in existence; this information would also be part of the information processing system of the Organization.

3. Verification of Destruction

Member states possessing chemical weapons would be required to provide the Organization with detailed plans for their destruction. These plans would describe the destruction facility and the procedures to be followed. An archival system could be implemented in an automated mode. Since the number of destruction facilities would be small worldwide, the information processing requirements for the verification of declarations of destruction facilities would likely be smaller worldwide than for Schedule 2 and 3 monitoring.

Monitoring the destruction of chemical weapons would require more elaborate information processing. One type of information would be accounting data about items and agents being destroyed and remaining stock balances. Another would contain information about the status of the destruction facility, including safeguards information to prevent diversion of agents or weapons during the final destruction step. Analytical chemical data would be needed for independent verification of the identity of the substances being destroyed. If the Organization were to adopt procedures for utilizing existing facility instrumentation to confirm the identity of chemicals, verification would consist of ensuring that instruments are calibrated properly, and that the integrity of the measurements is maintained.

The continuous presence of inspectors at the destruction facility, or possibly at other facilities, as well as the volume of data and the complexity of processing would likely require the establishment of a local information processing system; thus, some of the nodes of the global information system would have their own data bases and local processing requirements. The distributed nature of the information processing system would also pose substantial requirements for the security of the equipment and the data. Security requirements and system specifications to meet them need to be established.

4.0 Routine Monitoring

During the first ten years of the Convention, routine monitoring would provide data for evaluating compliance with non-diversion of