

Yet another example. It has been proposed -- by the delegation of the United States of America -- to prohibit in the future convention some almost mysterious chemical, specially designed to intensify the effects of the use of chemical weapons. After persistent requests to clarify everything involved, it was stated that the matter concerns substances capable of acting as solvents in chemical weapons or as thickening agents, of changing the viscosity of chemicals or their local stability, of increasing their capacity to penetrate the human skin or the charcoal filter of a gas mask, etc. Even from this list -- and it can, of course, be expanded -- it is clear that the matter does not concern a particular specific chemical, but a great number of chemicals. It is true that, in this connection, we have not been given the name of a single chemical. It is proposed, consequently, that substances unknown to anyone should not be developed, produced or stockpiled and that they should be destroyed. Can this be serious? Here, too, if a genuine need to resolve the above-mentioned question arose, the consultative committee would be able to take the appropriate steps.

In a word, we attach very great importance to the consultative committee and consider that it and its subsidiary organs should be assigned the task of the solution in practice of the broadest possible group of questions connected with the practical implementation of and compliance with the convention.

We proceed from the basis that the consultative committee, if reference is made to it as a collective body, would receive, have custody of and distribute information furnished by States parties in accordance with the requirements of the convention, would provide to States parties at their request assistance in the conduct of consultations among them, would work out recommendations and individual technical questions, etc.

It would also have to perform a considerable number of responsible functions with regard to the implementation and co-ordination of all forms of verification. In particular, we consider it important that the consultative committee should work out standardized verification methods and verify reports of cases involving the use of chemical weapons. The convention must also include a clear provision under which the consultative committee would determine the procedure and periods for carrying out verifications at facilities for the destruction of stocks and at facilities for the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes. It would take into account the size and characteristics of the stocks, data on the destruction facilities and on the permitted production, and a great deal more.

A most important task under the future convention will be the proper organization of the working interaction between international and national monitoring bodies. They should complement one another and assist one another, for otherwise, unless one is under the illusion of "constantly valid invitations", monitoring might prove to be imperfect. In this regard, too, it is clear that the consultative committee might have an outstanding role to play. It will have to concern itself even with such matters as the special training of national staff for carrying out inspections, the sealing of chemical weapons production facilities, the handling of seals, etc.

One would hope that these considerations will facilitate and speed up the preparation of the section of the future convention devoted to the consultative committee.

In connection with the consultative committee, I should like to draw attention to a matter of primary importance -- the composition of its main subsidiary organ, the executive council. We propose that this council should consist of 15 members, representatives of States parties to the convention, 10 of whom would be elected by the consultative committee on the principle of a two-year term for each party, five members being replaced each year; the remaining five seats would be set aside for the permanent