Fourth, identification of nuclear capable fighter bombers is possible with low confidence only. Possible characteristics to observe include: special communication, command and control links associated with nuclear release; hardening to allow operations in a nuclear environment; and an alert capability usually associated with US nuclear strike aircraft.

Cruise missiles are more difficult to monitor. Table 6-1 (p.117) identifies the confidence associated with monitoring schemes for long-range cruise missiles. In general, largely because of the small size of cruise missiles and ease of concealment, cruise missile characteristics and activities can be monitored with moderate confidence. Any deliberate attempt to conceal cruise missiles will reduce confidence to a low level. Measuring inventories of cruise missiles and distinguishing between nuclear and conventional cruise missiles can be done with low confidence only, but cruise missile range can be estimated with moderate confidence by observing missile volume (in the absence of concealment measures). Cruise missile tests are difficult to detect because of a low flight path and the short distance for transmitting telemetry to an accompanying airplane. Guidance technologies would be difficult to monitor unless active radar sounding is used to provide terrain contour matching (TERCOM) maps of the opponent's territory. Production would be difficult to monitor because of the small size of the missiles. Monitoring the deployment of cruise missiles by observing launch platforms is possible, but many launch platforms serve dual purposes and there are likely few observable differences between conventional and nuclear launchers. Cruise missile activity could probably be inferred by identifying associated equipment or handling procedures (for nuclear warheads, for example), but this would yield only low confidence.

Another method, beyond NTMs, for monitoring cruise missiles is on-site on-demand inspections. "External" inspections which permit inspection of questionable locations or launch platforms but prohibit boarding any aircraft, submarine or surface ship and entering any sensitive facility, would probably not be useful since cruise missiles could be stored out-of-sight. "Internal" inspections of any suspected cruise missile site would create high confidence if a large number of such inspections were allowed, but political opposition to inspections would be formidable.

Monitoring is distinct from verification because it involves observation and identification of objects and activities only whereas verification involves a judgment about whether an opponent's activities violate a treaty. Lower degrees of monitoring confidence usually lead to a decline in the chances for adequate verification, but broader political and military considerations may provide compensation. For example, covert aircraft deployments would probably not increase Soviet first-strike capability and deployment of nuclear cruise missiles among conventional missiles would not necessarily yield any offensive advantage. If cruise missiles are deployed in large numbers as a new strategic reserve force, then adequate verification is more readily achieved because small violations decrease in significance.