ings, and, on that ground, separately and specially, demand that the action shall be dismissed. They never once hint that the Court should disregard the demand for reduction of these sentences, and allow the case to proceed on the element of damage alone. On the contrary, they explicitly assert, as matter of law, that "no decree for damages can be pronounced" against them by the Civil Court. The exclusion is exhaustive. The Court, say they, cannot reduce, neither can it give damages; the whole case "should therefore be dismissed." In complete accordance with this pleading, Drs. Cunningham, Cairns, and Alexander are lauded by our contemporary as the greatest logicians of the age for maintaining that to their consciences must be given, in the language of Dr. Cunningham, "the authority of God." Men who are notoriously wide as the poles asunder upon many questions of Church government and doctrine, request the tribunals of justice to allow them complete exemption in such matters, even when they affect the most important civil interests of members of the community, from every species of control. Such is now the position, both in and out of Court.

Our unhappy contemporary has got completely bemuddled by the last bugbear "Reduction." The point, he assures us, is "whether the Civil Court should proceed by an action of reduction or damages," whether it should merely redress the civil wrong, or, "constituting itself a Court of ecclesiastical review, annul the sentence of the Church judicatory, and restore him (Mr. M'Millan to his ecclesiastical office, on due cause, according to its notions, being shown." It is somewhat strange that our contemporary should put such a question after the repeated assurances he has received that Mr. M'Millan has never asked the Court to replace him in his pulpit. His counsel, Mr. Macfarlane, assured the Court that no such thing was demanded. To quote the language of his written pleading (Minute of Debate) "the summons contains no conclusion for reinstating him in the spiritual office from which he was deposed." Nevertheless, disregarding these verbal and printed statements, of which our contemporary should, and of which the Assembly must be aware, they gravely proceed to assure the public that he is asking the Court "to restore him to his ecclesiastical office."

But our contemporary proceeds to ask us to consider "whether the action of damages does not answer our purpose, and cover the whole ground we consider it desirable the Civil Courts should occupy." We answer, decidedly not. And we are abundantly borne out in this view, not merely on grounds stated in our former articles on this point, but also by the course adopted by the defenders when the case was first brought into Court. On reference to their original defences we find them urging, as their first plea that Mr. M'Millan had "no title to sue." What did they mean by this plea? They could not mean that he had no right to pursue any action whatever, and must therefore, have meant that he had not the character of a Free Church minister—having been deposed—and had no right to pursue them. And hence an imperative necessity for the interposition of a conclusion that the Court should declare that deposition as being illegal and unwarrantable, and in excess of the power of the Assembly as Church officers, utterly null and void. Without this he could not have got the question of damages. But in so doing, the Court are not interfering with the legitimate management of the Assembly. The Assembly may begin again and depose Mr. M'Millan legally, if they can find sufficient ground for so doing, after their past illegal procedure has been declared null. Meanwhile, if it is found they have acted illegally, oppressively, or maliciously (and an offer is made to prove all the three), surely it cannot be pretended that the element which opened the door to the redress of this conduct would have been better absent than present. We must be excused for doubting the good faith of all who maintain so absurd a proposition. The acts of the Assembly, past and present, belie its honesty. The plea is purely technical. Neither can any one be so simple as for a moment to suppose that in a mere action of damages the defenders would not have raised precisely the same questions. Dr. Cunningham's statements are contradictory. But when he appears to hint that such an action would not have been met with like opposition, we refuse to give him credit for a faithful exposition of the views of the party with which he acts. It is patent to the country that their objections were unqualified by any admission whatever of the competency of civil interference, on the expressed grounds of the spirituality alike of their sentences and persons. That was, and still is, and, we believe, ever will be the plea of these men, whatever may be the kind of action by which they are brought into a Court of Justice. Their original plea of "no title," is a sufficient answer to their last juggling and disingenuous pretence. It meant, and only could mean, when stated as preliminary, that, even though the relevancy of the atrocities alleged were admitted, the pursuer had no power to bring them into Court, and means of connecting himself with the damage narrated.

We have now answered, explicitly or by implication, all the objections of our contemporary. Let him never again deceive his readers by alleging either that the demand for reduction was uncalled for, or that Mr. Macmillan has asked the Court to replace him in his pulpit at Cardross. Let him never again say that the civil authorities, in acting as they have done, claim to "prescribe