

that those to whom it may be new, will be, equally with ourselves, interested in it. We give it, therefore, below, as we find it in the London Quarterly Review, of September, 1812; composed of extracts from the New England Farmer's pamphlet previously noticed by us, together with the Reviewer's observations.* When our readers have

sufficiently examined this curious case, they may attach what force they think is due to the only observation we intend to add to this head, viz., that Mr. Madison—it has been asserted—sent out a copy of his war message to France, in the *Wasp*; and that this is not the only circumstance which affords reason for believing that France for some time be-

* What shall we say if it appear that this first aggression of 1806, which is now represented as the immediate cause of the Berlin Decree, was, for the first time, suggested by Mr. Madison, in 1806, (through General Armstrong to Buonaparte,) as a justifiable cause of the French decree?—that this blockade of 1806, which was approved by Mr. Munroe,—was not objected against by Mr. Jefferson in 1808,—was not even mentioned by Mr. Madison in the arrangement made with Mr. Erskine in 1809—but that this great and atrocious injury done to France and America, forgotten, neglected, and not once adverted to in four years' negotiation,—was brought forward, for the first time, to make a principal figure in 1810, for the express purpose, as it would seem, of throwing in the way invincible obstacles to any adjustment with Great Britain? Let us hear the 'farmers' on the subject.

"The first notice of it, as far as we can find, is in a letter from General Armstrong to Mr. Smith, our secretary of state, of January 20th, 1810, in which he details a conversation which he had held with Count Champagny, the French minister. In that letter Mr. Armstrong refers to a letter of December 1st, 1809, from Mr. Smith to himself, which has never been published, in which he is directed to demand of France—Whether, if Great Britain revoked her blockades of a date anterior to the decree commonly called the Berlin Decree, His Majesty the Emperor would consent to revoke that decree?" To which the Emperor, falling into the views of our government, and foreseeing the snare which would be laid for Great Britain, inasmuch as, if she consented to repeal said orders, it would be an admission that she had been the aggressor upon neutral commerce, and further, it would be an admission that she had no right to exert her only force, her maritime power, for the coercion of her enemy, replied "That the only condition required for the revocation of the decree of Berlin, will be a previous revocation by Great Britain of her blockades of France, or ports of France, of a date anterior to the aforesaid decree."

"So far the plot went on prosperously: and if Great Britain had fallen into the project, it would have been made the pretext for preventing any future blockades of even single ports of France, in which armaments for her destruction, or the destruction of her commerce, should be formed; and she would have relinquished to an enemy, whom she cannot attack

upon the continent on equal terms, the only weapons which God and her own valour had placed within her power."

The next step was to transmit this project for swindling Great Britain out of her maritime rights to Mr. Pinckney, the American minister in London, who accordingly demanded of Lord Wellesley 'whether Great Britain considered any, and if any, what blockades of the French coast, of a date anterior to the Berlin Decree, in force?' Lord Wellesley briefly answered, that 'the blockade of May, 1806, was comprehended in the Order of Council of January, 1807, which was yet in force.' A month afterwards, 7th March, 1810, Mr. Pinckney again asked 'whether the order of May, 1806, was merged in that of January, 1807?' to which Lord Wellesley replied 'that it was comprehended under the more extensive orders of January, 1807.'

Mr. Pinckney, though not quite satisfied with Lord Wellesley's answers, wrote to General Armstrong, 'that the inference from them was, that the blockade of May, 1806, is virtually at an end, being merged and comprehended in an Order of Council issued after the date of the Berlin Decree.' This inference, however, did not suit any of the intriguing parties; and General Armstrong does not seem to have thought it necessary to ruffle the repose of his Imperial Majesty, by submitting the point to M. Champagny; at least nothing further appears till the extraordinary letter of the Duc de Cadore, in which the Berlin and Milan Decrees are promised to be repealed, provided Great Britain will repeal her orders, and 'renounce her principles of blockade which she wishes to establish:—' terms,' says the Farmer, 'which every man will perceive might be construed to amount to the surrender of all her maritime rights.'

"That there was a secret understanding between our cabinet and that of France, that Great Britain should be required to annul her blockades of a date anterior to the Berlin Decree, and that this suggestion first came from our cabinet, will appear from the two following extracts of letters from our secretary Smith, to Mr. Pinckney; the one is dated in July, 1810, in which he says, "you will let it be distinctly understood that the repeal must necessarily include an annulment of the blockade of May, 1806: this is the explanation which will be given by our minister at Paris to the