



CANADA MILITARY GAZETTE.

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 1857.

Practical Instructions for Troops acting against an Insurgent Mob in Streets, or elsewhere, and also for Officers Commanding in Detached Quarters.

BY CAPTAIN MACLEOD MOORE.

1st.—Officers Commanding detached Troops should always calculate beforehand as far as possible how they would act under all possible circumstances—they should well consider what are the most defensible posts in the immediate vicinity of their Quarters, and where they could take post, in case of being driven to do so—they should be well acquainted with every Bridge and Defile near them; and understand from whence reinforcements are to be expected, or by what road they are to retreat and meet them.

2nd.—They should prepare the means of the readiest possible communication with the Troops nearest at hand, so as to communicate at once, in case occasion should arise to require their doing so—this may be done either by employing persons of the country in whom confidence can be placed, or by disguising some one of the men.

3rd.—When Troops are ordered out to quell disturbances, they must be taken that position

should be desperate enough to make a rush on them, or in order to keep them at arms length to commence a fire, when perhaps by the assistance of a few Cavalry this fatal alternative might be avoided.

7th.—In the event of any Detachment finding itself so surrounded by a large body of Insurgents as neither to be able to advance or retreat without considerable danger of being overpowered, the officer in command will immediately throw his force into the most defensible position that he finds within reach, occupying a house, or houses if possible, and if not, getting behind such Banks or Dikes as present themselves, over which his men can fire under some protection, whilst they afford an obstacle to a rush being made on the party; for this purpose the angles of roads or fields will be found most favourable. In occupying houses, it should be recollected that such as are slated, or tin roofed, and such also as afford protection to each other, are always to be preferred, whilst thatched and shingled houses, and such as can be approached under cover, should be avoided,—but mud cabins and log shanties even may be made very defensible by either lowering the walls, so that the men may fire over them, or else by loopholing them; either of which may be easily accomplished,—whenever Troops are placed in the situation here contemplated immediate measures must be taken to communicate with the nearest Post either of Cavalry or Infantry: this communication must be made either by means of a mounted Officer, and a few Cavalry (if any should happen to be with the Detachment,) forcing their way through the assailants, or crossing fields in order to pass them, or else by the means direct

provisions, and ammunition, to enable the defenders of the Post to retire, in case of their being hard pressed and beaten in from the defence of such buildings beyond its precincts, which it might have been desirable to seize and occupy in order to make a good defence of the Barrack or Post.

The Siege of Ostend Compared with the Siege of Sebastopol.

[Translated from the German by HERA LOUIS FRENZ, late sub-colonel in the 12th. or Prince Charles' Regiment of the Line, of the Prussian army.]

Ambrosio Spinola soon found a way to win the esteem of the troops. He improved the internal economy of the Army, closed new arrangements with the Army-contractors, and severely punished all neglect, fraud, or embezzlement, so that his soldiers were not obliged to march barefooted, as neither boots nor uniforms were to be received unless tried as to their fitting, without regard to the profits of the contractors.

He entirely abandoned the plans hitherto followed out for the reduction of the fortress, after he discovered their impracticability, and designed a new plan, which he followed up with iron energy and perseverance.

The principal exertions of the Archduke Albrecht had been directed to the occupation of the harbour, by which means he would have cut off reinforcements and provisions, for as Sebastopol was supplied by way of Perekop, so was Ostend supplied by Sea, for like Sebastopol, it was not completely surrounded. Spinola quite set aside Albrecht's plan, and determined to make his attacks from the land side only, and the investment.

liged
-rs

four most important advantages possessed by regular Troops over a Mob are "discipline" and "fire"—especial care must therefore be taken not to lose these advantages by allowing the Troops to come in contact with the people; they must be held at arms length—the Bayonet is very good when opposed to a regular enemy, but it would be sacrificing much to attempt to use it, unless driven to it, where hundreds are opposed to thousands.

5th.—Above all things in moving Troops through the Country, the greatest care must be taken not to allow them to be drawn into an ambush—the best possible look out must be kept, by examining cross-roads, woods, farm buildings, in passing, and always having in front and on the flanks looking out, some active intelligent men and officers.

6th.—Whenever Troops are called out to assist the Civil Power, it is highly advisable to combine Cavalry and Infantry. Some four or six mounted men to accompany a small Detachment of Infantry will be found very advantageous—they will be able to keep a good look out at some little distance in front, or on the flanks of the Detachment, so as to prevent surprise—and if the Detachment is opposed by Insurgents they will serve to keep them at a distance until such time as it becomes absolutely necessary to fire in self defence, when the Cavalry will fall rapidly back, leaving a clear front for the Infantry to act; whereas Infantry by themselves are either obliged to permit a Mob to approach so near as to render it dangerous in case they

windows of each of which a fire can be brought on the other, so as to afford mutual protection, or one house the windows of which command all its entrances.

9th.—Great care must be taken at all times when acting in streets, not to enter deep without occupying some houses in the line of advance, that will secure communication with the Rear and Reserve bodies.

10th.—It would be very desirable also for officers in command of Detached Quarters to have their men told off to the Stations they are to occupy, in case of any sudden alarm, and that they should be drilled to repair, each man to his post, as is practised on board ships of war, where the crews are "beaten to quarters." This would accustom the men to act at once without confusion either by day or night.

11th.—In the event of an alarm of fire occurring by night, if men are thus properly told off, one party will at once turn out and proceed to the Engine House without waiting for further orders,—a second party armed and accoutred will proceed to the Guard House as a reinforcement to the guard; and the remainder will fall in with arms and accoutrements in their Barrack rooms or at a specified alarm post, and await orders.

12th.—The strongest part of the Barrack, and the one which has most command over the rest, should be fixed upon as a sort of "Keep" or "Citadel," and placed in the best state of defence the circumstances, and the nature of the building will admit of; with a supply of water,

rison from one position.

Winter set in.

A Winter on the coast of West Flanders, under the 51st and 52nd degree of latitude, is surely not milder than a winter before Sebastopol, but Spinola carried his army safely through it, without suffering great losses—his principal means of effecting this was by keeping a sharp eye on the contractors.

Vere, on the other side, and after him the successors in command, Daniel de Hertaign, and Herr Von Marquette, displayed equal skill in the system of defence, with which they opposed the designs of the besiegers; as they had neither time nor material for the construction of stone walls, they threw up earth works, and no sooner had the Spaniards with an immense loss of men, carried an outwork, or Redoubt, than another work rose up, almost miraculously, as it were, behind it. Who is there that will not at once be struck with the strong similarity between this system, and that pursued by Totten at Sebastopol?

An historian of the time says, "Soon Ostend looked like another place;—it was no more a City; each house was a Citadel; the whole fortress was a labyrinth of bulwarks; each quarter was in itself an independent fort." Any one who attentively followed the correspondence of the French and English newspapers will recollect that it was the same at Sebastopol.

Meantime the besiegers advanced gradually, though slowly, and Spinola energetically fol-