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during the 1974-75 season and nearly 30,000 during 1975-76).

The above list of projects and products shows that the agreements in all areas clearly favour the long term. The sale of 20 diesel locomotives by M.L.W. Worthington of Montreal, the 50 ore-cars from Wajax International, the production of cardboard cartons used for shipping eggs, the presence of sizeable herds of Canadian livestock, and, of course, the medical agreements already signed by Marc Lalonde providing for exchanges of medical personnel - all these agreements require either spare parts or technicians from Canada. For Cuba, the sale of sugar, seafood (especially lobsters), tobacco and rum gives equal encouragement to longterm trade with Canada. If Cuba is able to diversify its production further in such a way as to enlarge its Canadian market even more, we shall see perfect harmony, at least in trade relations between the two countries. Although it is extremely unlikely that Cuba will abandon the path of socialism to follow Canada (or vice versa), it is still obvious that this co-operation brings out a special quality in the dialogue between the two countries. If Mr. Trudeau's prediction is to be believed — that more and more developing nations will be choosing the Cuban model -, then this dialogue between Canada and Cuba may serve as a lesson to the members of the international community that have begun or will soon begin to develop.

If one assumes the desirability of keeping one's distance from the United States and agrees with Canada's intentions regarding development in Latin America in general and Cuba in particular, what other Canadian interests can be discerned in this friendship with the southern countries?

The Organization of American States, in which Canada holds observer status, seems to have become inoperative of recent years. The other American countries regard it as functioning only in accordance with the interests of the United States. Canada, in establishing closer relations with Latin America, is moving more and more towards the role of judge or adviser in Latin America. In fact, because of the aid policy instituted by ^{Canada,} its image in Latin America tends to be positive. Canada's role in the South American continent appears more and more as a trump card, enabling it, among other things, to come of age in international politics, as Georges Vigny of Montreal's Le Devoir has observed.

Before the Cuban revolution, the United States enjoyed 60 per cent of the

Cuban market. It seems to have taken 14 years for Canada and Cuba to realize that they could take advantage of the opportunity to establish solid links between themselves.

Several factors

According to Professor Jack Oglesby ("Continuing U.S. influence on Canada-Cuba relations", International Perspectives, September/October 1975), Canada's position on the Castro regime was conditioned by several factors. In the first place, the Canadian public had had to rely in the main on information emanating from the American media. In addition, the Cuban links with the Soviet Union and the Cuban Government's interest in exporting revolution led both Mr. Pearson and Mr. Diefenbaker to remain within the limits of merely correct relations with Cuba. Professor Oglesby also states that the Cuban Government, for its part, perceived Canada as a close ally of the United States, which could not be treated with the same enthusiasm and friendliness shown towards fellow Soviet-bloc nations. It was only after the Department of External Affairs had revised its Latin American policy that the relation between the two countries finally changed. If one looks back at the economic balance between them, it can be realized that, from 1969 to 1976, Canada has made up for lost time.

Finally, there remains the question of Canada's role in the continuing situation of conflict between the United States and Cuba. Léon Mayrand thought that it was through a more active role within the OAS that Canada's contribution to the settlement of the conflict could be made. This Canadian intervention between Cuba and the United States could not, however, be made without preliminary discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The special brand of détente that exists among the Latin American countries, the United States and Cuba will undoubtedly have an impact on détente in its more usual sense (décrispation, as Valéry Giscard d'Estaing calls it, or razryadka, as the Soviets call it).

In the meantime, although some expressed their shock when in February they heard the now famous "Viva Cuba! Viva el Primer ministro Commandante Fidel Castro!", it cannot be denied that the friendship that exists between the Canadian and Cuban peoples may be a new symbol of good relations between the "haves" and the "have-nots" in the international system.

Canadian role in conflict between Cuba and United States