

British safe-
r are home.

Can we
this part of
that which
the better
apt at revol-
those who
the most val-
that portion
of the home
and cautious,
t that which
war between
are cool,
knew that
is folly; but
en you will
to our stand-
of blood, I
and on the
ings and de-
der too well
to add, that
tyranny is
out has also
high places;
er" are pan-
deliverance.
o armies on
face, a scene
one at Tre-

offered here
committee on
at substitute
the other end
first glimpse
constitute the
pen enemies
That it will
of the Whig
er". When I
State from
confess that
and the idea
State would
earless, and
quishes their
se. A more
sible propo-
fall. Sir, I
out do I de-
with the con-
of Oregon.
ey desire to
hole on the
oo, after ar-
thing more
howing by
ous of put-
ch properly
of one man
elve years"
I cannot,
meets a re-
ent hearts of
ea of shift-
and they

will yet spurn the man who thus seeks to place them in a false position.

But the most humiliating part of this proposition is yet to be told. After authorizing the President to give or not give the notice—which, according to Whig logic here, means to "make or not make war,"—just as he pleases, the whole proposition winds up with the *bold* proviso that it shall not be given "till after the adjournment of the present session of Congress." Yes, sir; after the whole power and responsibility of making war (so Whig logic will have it) is put on the President, they turn round and most impudently say, "Mr. President, don't give this notice now; don't make war till after we get out of this city; for if you do, we might find it convenient to follow in the footsteps of our illustrious predecessors, "the Bladensburg ratters."

One word as to the object of the Whigs in assuming this extraordinary ground. They no doubt still find themselves haunted by their Federal brethren who fell (politically) in the celebrated Hartford convention battle. Those "perturbed spirits" have unquestionably admonished their lineal descendants that it is highly expedient in all matters pertaining to this notice, to play a kind of a "good-God-good-devil" game. "That's our game," say they. "If the President give the notice in accordance with our substitute, and it should be followed by war and some serious consequences, we can turn upon the Democratic party, and say, Gentlemen, *we are not responsible*; this is all the fault of your wicked President; he gave the notice too soon; he gave it too late; we wash our hands of all this; the blood be on *your* heads." "But look on the other side," say they; "here again is a glorious chance for escape. If the President takes *all the responsibility*, and gives the notice, and the peaceable acquisition of Oregon should follow, why we can modestly tell our countrymen that we, too, were in favor of the notice; that we were for Oregon—for every inch of Oregon; and that we acted a *brave and fearless* part in behalf of all the proceedings which led to its acquisition. We will show most conclusively that cases alter circumstances, as well as that circumstances alter cases."

Should this scheme of thrusting on the President powers to perform duties which properly belong to Congress, and which the people sent us here to perform—if this scheme succeeds, let me assure gentlemen that there will be no "backing-out"—no cowardly evasion of responsibility. He has the nerve that will not quail before any power, save the power of God. The notice will be given with that promptness which characterizes all his acts. But, sir, I shall oppose, with all the power which I may possess, this or any other effort to transfer powers from the legislative to the executive department of this Government. The power to make treaties unquestionably belongs to the President and Senate jointly; but the power to unmake, or abrogate, can only be performed in two ways consistent with the Constitution. First, by the President and Senate in making a new treaty, the provisions of which may set aside the old or pre-existing one; and, secondly, by the joint action of both Houses of Congress. Our object, as expressed on all sides of the House, is, to *abrogate* the treaty of 1818, as renewed in 1827 between Eng-

land and the United States, which is clearly a legislative duty, that cannot be performed constitutionally by any other power than the joint power of both Houses of Congress, as proposed by the resolution before us.

[At this stage of his remarks, a message from the President was presented to the House, by Mr. Walker, his private secretary, enclosing the late correspondence between Mr. Pakenham, the British Minister, and Mr. Buchanan, the Secretary of State, containing a proposition by the former, and a rejection by the latter, to arbitrate the subject of dispute in Oregon. After the reading of this correspondence, Mr. Fairs resumed, as follows:]

Mr. Chairman, my time being nearly expired, I shall add but little more. Permit me to say, however, that the character of this correspondence inspires me with new hope of success and refreshed confidence in the firmness of the Administration. To have yielded to arbitration—such arbitration as proposed—would have been a betrayal of the just expectations of the American people. Who would trust the adjudication of our rights in Oregon to any crowned head? None, I hope, in this House. And who would accede to that other proposition, which would leave it to arbitrators selected from both Governments, with power, in case of disagreement, to select an umpire? Gentlemen can certainly see at a glance that this is a gambling proposition, by which England would have two chances to our one. The original arbitrators would undoubtedly disagree; nothing else could be expected; and then from whence would come the umpire? Not from the United States—not from England—but just where England would want him from—from some European State. Where would be the difference between this mode of settlement, or leaving it to a foreign Power at once? All the power being in the umpire, and that umpire being foreign, there could be no difference, of course. Sir, all those propositions to arbitrate are essentially the same; and I therefore glory in the prompt rejection of them all.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to see a disposition manifested here to create the impression that there is a war party in this House; and from the language of some gentlemen, I doubt not that upon the "West" is to be charged the major part of this supposed war spirit. Sir, we spurn the charge, direct or indirect, of being desirous of urging this Government into an unnecessary war. We are as emphatically a peace-loving people as those in any other section of this nation. The people which I have the honor to represent, estimate as highly as any others the blessings of peace; they know its benign influences upon science, the arts, religion; upon everything tending to the happiness of mankind. But, sir, firm and fixed as our convictions are of the blessings of peace, we will never be found willing to yield to any other than an honorable peace. To our rights we shall cling with a grip as unyielding as death. Those rights must be preserved. Cost it treasure, cost it blood, they shall be preserved. We have entered the field to maintain those rights, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must." We pitched our tents, and, if God willing, they shall never be struck till the stars and stripes wave over Oregon every inch of Oregon.