The learned judge thinks it a hardship, however, in civil cases, that one or two jurors may prevent the decision of a case, where the other ten or eleven are quite agreed as to the verdict. Civil trials go by the preponderance of evidence, upon a balancing of the weight of testimony, and the contention is that it would be a useful extension of the principle, if some less number than the whole jury should be authorized to render a verdict. The number required to concur in the verdict should probably, the learned judge thinks, be as high as nine.

Trial by jury in criminal cases stands upon different ground. Here unanimity should be required. It is not a matter of preponderance of evidence, but of reasonable certainty. It is better that nine guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should be found guilty.

Exception is also taken to the rules governing the disqualification of jurors. These too often result in excluding the intelligent man, and accepting the ignorant one. The old principle of the English law that a man should be tried by a jury of his neighbours, has ceased to have any place in the system of criminal jurisprudence. The man who takes an interest in what is going on in public life, who reads the journals, and who is familiar with rumour and the current of public opinion, becomes, in the United States, disqualified, if they have had any influence in forming an opinion in his mind. The ignorant and stupid are often the remnant who try the defendant. This difficulty does not, of course, arise in this country.

WE are in receipt of a letter from an esteemed correspondent who writes in reference to the article on "The Law of Divorce" which appeared in our last number, but it arrived too late for insertion in this issue; we shall have pleasure in laying it before our readers at an early date. Discussions on the same topic are, we observe, not confined to Canadian journals, though the tenor of the remarks made, and the nature of the evils complained of, are somewhat different among our neighbours from what they are in Canada.

The American Law Review has an article on Divorce Legislation in which it is contended that any attempt to secure uniformity in the divorce laws of the various states, by means of national legislation, is needless. It is contended that the hardships which result from divorce proceedings are not so much a consequence of the diversity of causes for which divorces are granted, as of the refusal of some of the states to recognize as valid, decrees granted in other states in which but one of the divorced parties resides. While hardship may, and doubtless does, result from that cause, it must, we think, be conceded that national legislation would secure uniformity. *The Review* seems to think that the lapse of time will best bring about that result, through the growth of public sentiment, which, it asserts, is strongly in favour of two things, viz., not to grant divorces except for adequate causes, and to hold decrees valid where rendered, valid everywhere. Two of the chief evils of the American system are inadequately dealt with. One of these is the insufficiency of the grounds on which divorce is granted; the other is the loose, and often fraudulent, way in which the law, such as it is, is too often administered in many of the so-called courts.