

necessary to go. Kingston cannot be attacked, except by water, till Upper Canada shall have fallen; and if you so distribute its defences as to render a landing difficult and dangerous, you have done all in this quarter which circumstances admit of. The case is different both in Amherstburg and Niagara. There such places as Sandwich and Fort Dalhousie would simply be in the way. They might tempt a general to throw a few men into them whom he would certainly lose. But in the rear both of Amherstburg and the Niagara there are positions which, if taken up and rendered as strong as the skill of man can make them, would render the subjugation of these districts, if not impossible, at all events very tedious and very difficult.

Looking first to the Amherstburg territory, we find that the only retreat left open to Colonel Proctor in the last war was up the valley of the Thames. The same line would certainly be chosen now by an army worsted on the frontier; for the Grand Trunk Railway runs from Amherstburg to London, and from London by Hamilton to Toronto and Kingston. London itself thus becomes an important strategical point, being at once sufficiently removed from the border to serve as a place of muster for the militia of the district, and sufficiently near to afford security to the corps which might have engaged and been overcome by an invading army in Essex county. It is important, likewise, as holding the key to the only door of rapid communication between the extreme west of what may be called the settled portions of Canada and the Atlantic. It appears to us, therefore, that the Imperial Government will do well to take possession of as much land in this quarter as may enable our engineers to construct, without delay, an intrenched camp capable of being defended by 5000 men. With such a camp interposing between them and a march down the country, it is not probable that the American column, even if successful in the first instance, will

ever venture more than a few miles from its place of landing.

For the same reasons, and because the material facilities of the ground are even more striking, we would suggest the construction of a second intrenched camp of similar dimensions on Burlington Heights. These heights, it will be remembered, constituted the *point d'appui* on which, during the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814, the troops told off for the protection of the Niagara district always rallied after some temporary reverse. The town of Hamilton is now connected with them, and they command both its harbour, which is good, and the Grand Trunk Railway. Five thousand men thrown into an intrenched camp in this position would hold at bay any number of invaders, till time should have been afforded to call out the whole strength of the province.

We have alluded elsewhere to the possibility of an attempt by *coup-de-main* on Quebec. Not that we consider such an occurrence at all likely to happen. An American general would scarcely venture, with New Brunswick on his flank, to march by the uncleared portions of Maine, only that he might fight his way up to a broad river, through a district so well peopled and so warlike as St. Francis. But in war even possibilities must be guarded against. Quebec is strong already; its strength will be increased by surrounding the detached towers which now crown the Heights of Abraham with solid earthworks; and by looking to that exposed corner of the lower town, by which, during the war of the Revolution, Arnold had wellnigh entered. This being done, and care taken to have the magazines and arsenals well filled, we need not entertain the smallest apprehension for Quebec; and so long as Quebec remains in possession of British troops, the permanent conquest of Canada by the Americans will remain to be effected.

Having thus provided points at which the local militia may collect, and places of strength to which corps, worsted in a first encounter,