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(2) It pointed out that the principle of "home" or "local," or "domestic defence," if indiscriminately applied, as it has been by the wholesale creation of forces which cannot be moved from the soils on which they are raised, must produce Imperial weakness, not Imperial strength.

(8) That the United Kingdom is merely the "grand base" of the Empire, that for this reason it must be rendered secure, not only from capture but also from having its communications cut near home. Were the latter contingency to happen it would be helpless as regards itself, while it would cease to be of any value to the rest of the Empire with which it could not then communicate.

(4) That even supposing the United Kingdom secured both against invasion, and the interruption of its water roads near home, there yet remained to be effectually guarded against as pressing and as serious a contingency, viz. partial investment by an enemy operating against one or more of its communications, with the other portions of that Empire of which it is but the heart and citadel. For example: an opposing naval force operating with St. Helena as a base, at the crossings of the South Atlantic, would cut the whole of the Imperial communications round both Capes; and were the Suez Canal to be blocked at the same time, the whole Empire, except Canada and the West Indies, would be locked out from its grand base, and the United Kingdom would be partially invested.

(5) That we can only secure the Imperial water roads, first, by a firm, strong grasp at all times of the points which command them; second, by fleets adequate to the requirements of keeping free and open the lines between the points.

(6) That those fleets would be paralysed in their action if the points between which they are to operate are not held by military forces sufficient to render the protection of the sea-going fleets unnecessary; or, if there are not in addition at these points, stores of coal and means of repair adequate to the requirements of the fleets of which they are the base.

The reasons for these conclusions will be found stated shortly in that paper, and at greater length in other papers and works I have put forward during the last eleven years. They have never been disputed, and though they were most unpopular eleven years ago, because we could think of nothing at home, but our own personal safety, they are now happily attracting attention. The "genie" of the British Empire is rising out of the "pot" of the United Kingdom in which it was too long confined. May this "spirit"