

Mr. McINTOSH: What in your opinion, was the reason behind the conflict on the Indian border?

Mr. TAYLOR: I will give an opinion but I will first say that it is highly complex. I think there are probably very few people today who have studied all the relevant documents and looked at all the relevant maps and read all the relevant historical records and so on. I certainly have not, so I do not pretend to be an expert. My understanding is that if we have to assign guilt or blame, it is about equal. I think the Indians bear at least half the responsibility of the matter getting to the state where there were military hostilities. China's interests, as I see them, were primarily in the western area, in the Ladakh area, in that disputed section where they had built a road called the Aksai-Chin Road, which was of vast strategic importance to them since it links Sinkiang and Tibet, areas of political, military and racial sensitivity. The road was built in disputed territory not controlled by India. Indian patrols started pushing up towards it through disputed territory; the Chinese felt the road was menaced and they pushed the Indians back, at the same time launching a diversionary attack on Assam on the east, perhaps to get something to bargain with.

Mr. McINTOSH: I would like to go back for a moment to the two groups in China at the present time, because I forgot to ask you a question. It seemed to me, when you were describing the fears of Mao, that you listed practically every person in China. You said the peasants, the young people, the middle class and so on. Is there any group in China that he does not fear?

Mr. TAYLOR: I will try and say what he thinks. Mao, I think, would feel, in respect of these tendencies that I have described, that these fears of his exist in all these groups, but in all these groups there are people who can be relied upon, the hard core Maoists. Also, there are vast numbers who can also be converted, indoctrinated, persuaded, trained and disciplined into seeing the right line. He is a great believer in mass persuasion of one sort or another, intensive indoctrination. He also believes in people working together and moving together en masse, being swept up en masse and even being converted en masse. Therefore, these campaigns, which are run by the people whom he regards as dedicated hard core loyalists to himself, are used to generate an atmosphere in which other people will be converted. It is conversion that he seeks. He does not want lip service; he wants genuine conversion.

Mr. McINTOSH: In regard to the Canadian position, do the Chinese feel that we are a satellite of the United States?

Mr. TAYLOR: What they have said publicly tends to suggest that they have said it quite openly. What Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin said last November and December about the United Nations position was interpreted by them officially as supporting the nefarious American-to-China scheme or words to this effect. In private conversation, I have sometimes found them following the same line but in a more polite, almost embarrassingly sympathetic way. It has been sort of conveyed that, "Well, it is too bad you cannot adopt a more independent foreign policy but, of course, we understand the reason." I have argued back, of course, but it is a very embarrassing thing.

Mr. FAULKNER: How did you do it?

Mr. TAYLOR: I listed our trade with them and our policy over Cuba.