

shape of the security forum itself was just beginning to be discussed, but Canada wanted to avoid allowing consultations on the security forum to dictate the CPC's future.

In day-to-day operations, the CPC was in fact proving less effective than hoped. Many states had not provided the CPC with even the most basic CSBM information. Discussion of the production of a yearbook and the establishment of a data bank was at a stalemate pending resolution of a dispute about Soviet information exchanged in April 1991. Even then, states seemed reluctant to include certain types of data and were squabbling about whether the yearbook had to be produced in all six CSCE languages. On the other hand, the civil war in Yugoslavia, the failed coup in the USSR and growing signs of ethnic tension throughout Europe were leading to renewed interest in strengthening the CSCE's ability to deal with conflict. While Canada and others agreed that the CPC had not fulfilled initial expectations, they believed that much of the problem was due to the failure to give the Centre adequate tools to do its job.

Most states agreed that if the CPC were to act effectively it had to have more instruments at its disposal: fact-finding and monitoring missions, good offices and arbitration capabilities, verification tools. In September 1991, Germany distributed to the Consultative Committee an "illustrative model" recommending that the CPC be given responsibilities for facilitating regular consultations between participating states on all aspects of security, enabling the exchange of information between CFE signatories and other CSCE members on CFE implementation, and arranging for fact-finding missions and observers, especially in connection with Paragraph 17 of the Vienna Document 1990 (Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities).

In mid-October, Canada circulated to participating states a working paper on "The Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism of the CSCE."<sup>20</sup> This proposed that:

- the CPC should be designated the CSCE institution for the resource list of experts associated with the strengthened human dimension mechanism;
- the mandate of the Consultative Committee should be broadened to enable it to become the body responsible for implementing Council or CSO decisions in areas where it has been mandated authority; i.e. it should strengthen the existing procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes and develop additional instruments and procedures for the timely dispatch of fact-finding missions, conciliators or mediators;
- consider establishing a compulsory conflict prevention and resolution mechanism (i.e., the procedure for crisis panels and reference to Council originally proposed in the Humber College speech);
- develop guidelines and operational procedures for the establishment of CSCE monitoring missions and/or peacekeeping forces;
- consider ways in which the CPC could support national verification efforts; and
- provide a forum for ongoing dialogue on security-related issues, such as conventional arms transfers, non-proliferation, and UN disarmament issues.

Canada also proposed improving the CSO's ability to respond quickly and effectively to crisis situations by reducing the time lag between the request for an emergency meeting

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<sup>20</sup>Included in Annex.