

Given the current Indo-Pakistan military balance, along with continual expressions of India's commitment to a pro-deterrent course, it is difficult to foresee how Islamabad would readily agree to any reciprocal no-first use pledge. Nor is it likely to enter into any ban on the production of fissile material (unless existing stockpiles are taken into account). And any arrangements limiting the size and quality of its conventional capabilities would be similarly rejected.

The prospects for regional confidence and security-building measures (CSBMS) may be somewhat more positive. Past practice suggests that CSBMs have generally been developed following periods of intense crisis. And the prospect of further weaponization of the Indian arsenal along with a lack of movement on the arms control and disarmament front may well generate the "crisis atmosphere" required for a renewal of interest in the confidence-building enterprise. In fact, such conditions could well create opportunities for the elaboration and more effective implementation of a number of measures, including: hot-line agreements between parties, "no-attack" agreements governing nuclear installations, agreements calling for advance notifications on military exercises, manoeuvre and troop movements, and agreements aimed at military data exchange. Recent calls for the creation of regional nuclear risk reduction centres would likely generate similar interest.

Insuring sustained and consistent application of such measures would be more challenging. Commitment to CSBMs has tended to wane over time.³² And while a more nuclearized environment could create a sense of purpose previously absent, this could not be taken for granted. As such, continual monitoring would be required to insure against a renewal of past practice.

The implications of Indian nuclear plans for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are more troubling. Certainly, New Delhi's claims that it requires no further testing to move forward with its nuclear deterrent removes an obstacle to its willingness to endorse the regime. And recent press commentary indicates that New Delhi may be anxious to cultivate a more positive image in the international community.

Nevertheless, New Delhi's pro-nuclear stance threatens to reduce the chances of acquiring other endorsements needed to eventually bring the Treaty into force. It raises concerns about the value (and permanence) of some of the endorsements given. And ultimately, it works to raise profound questions regarding the treaty's true value and significance – particularly as an effective disarmament measure.

Already, concerns over India's nuclear programme have fed opposition as to the value of the regime. Concerns over Pakistani reaction are especially high – in fact generating interest in allowing Islamabad to undertake "conditional" endorsement – whereby future Pakistani testing would be

³² For elaboration, see Peter Gizewski, *Confidence-Building and Risk Reduction in the India-Pakistan Relationship: past Problems and Current Prospects*, (Ottawa: DFAIT, 20 July 1998).