

the Security Council has promoted a standard package of ceasefires, demobilisation of combatants, and integration of government and rebel forces, all in support of internationally-monitored elections. This approach presumes that the prior civil strife represents only a temporary break in the unity of the political community of the state, something that can be overcome by the legitimacy of a popularly-elected government.

For the second type of conflict, those which turn on *ethnic identity and group autonomy*, the Security Council promotes a somewhat different package. The Council still urges ceasefires and demobilisation as preliminary steps, but recognises that these conflicts are more complicated and seldom amenable to resolution through majoritarian electoral politics. In countries deeply divided by ethnic identities, voting can resemble census-taking, where numerical minorities are not satisfied with solutions predicated on majority rule. In such cases, therefore, the Security Council has tried to promote more complex political bargains, designed to share power among competing ethnic groups through such devices as regional autonomy, minority vetoes over government policy, and seat reservations for minorities in offices at the national level.

In abstract terms, both types of settlements represent attractive goals for collective intervention, and in some respects the normative implications are similar. The active pursuit of both has made inroads into domestic jurisdiction, not only because of the need to redefine what constitutes peace and security, but also because of the goals pursued. External efforts to restructure intra-state politics along democratic or power-sharing lines interfere directly in the independence and domestic jurisdiction of states. In addition, the pursuit of both types of settlements has forced a relaxation of the legal requirements for state consent to outside intervention, as external actors have been forced to negotiate with factions that have a tendency to multiply, disappear, and re-form.

In other respects, however, the practical and normative implications of these two approaches differ greatly. Settlements based on majoritarian politics are easier to achieve and more likely to endure than inter-ethnic power sharing. The UN has had considerable success in promoting electoral settlements in ideologically-divided countries such as Cambodia. In contrast, UN success in promoting inclusive settlements for identity-based conflicts seems more elusive. While this may mean that the Security Council should apply an element of coercion to such situations, it is hard to determine to what degree, and to what ends. One participant cautioned that power sharing arrangements should not be viewed as *permanent* solutions, and that a synthesis approach which accounted for both types of settlements would allow for more flexible agreements.

Clearly, however, there is a tension between the liberal democratic paradigm, reflected in Security Council-backed accords that centre on majoritarian democratic elections, and the power sharing arrangements that the Council sometimes promotes as a solution to identity-based conflict. But in societies with deep ethnic divisions, this may be the only way to achieve an effective balance among the interests of various groups. In this sense, the conventional interpretation of self-determination may be moving away from a perceived right of independence to something that entails greater focus on how to achieve different modes of political participation within a given state. Such a perspective would appear