

SUMMARY

Foreign and domestic policy in the USSR are depicted in terms of the interaction of two principal tendencies, neo-Stalinist and reform. The neo-Stalinist trend is seen in the use of détente and limited agreements with Western powers for offensive political purposes, and in limited de-Stalinization internally and in Eastern Europe. The reform trend is observed in Soviet endeavours to obtain politically stabilizing agreements that permit a reallocation of resources to favour more rapid economic development and liberalization in the USSR and bloc countries. Both trends are reflected in the Soviet approach to the CSCE. The reform trend has gained influence since 1969, and the current military, political, and economic situation indicates it may be still more evident in Soviet behaviour at the Conference later this year. Though precise forms of Soviet conduct cannot be predicted, intra-Party discussions concerning Soviet activity prior to the Genoa Economic Conference of 1922, indicate that Moscow may appear at the CSCE with a set of proposals for East-West cooperation considerably more comprehensive and reasonable than anything they have recently produced. Against this background of attractive and possibly even workable measures, they would make political concessions in the pursuit of economic objectives and a stabilization of East-West relations conducive to internal reform in the USSR. Soviet behaviour would not be free of offensive political ambition, and the Conference will not itself solve the problems of a divided Europe. The forthcoming period is nevertheless a propitious one for action designed to tilt Moscow into a posture of long-term East-West accommodation that increasingly restricts the neo-Stalinist orientation in Kremlin policies toward the West, Eastern Europe, and its own population.